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I. Introduction 
 
The literature on the goals of competition law has become a recurrent and rapidly 
expanding academic business. Since the well-known attack of Judge Robert Bork against the 
“populist” antitrust of the Warren Court in United States (US) and his assertion, along with 
other members of the Chicago school, that antitrust should have economic efficiency (what is 
considered now as a total welfare standard)
 
as a single objective,
2
 a plethora of academic 
articles and books in the US have challenged or supported this thesis and have advanced 
different theoretical frameworks on the goals of antitrust
3
. More recently, the debate has 
gained prominence in Europe, with a number of publications dedicated to this topic
4
. 
Although the debate in Europe is not as polarized as in the United States and has less 
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 Bork, R.H. (1978), The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, Basic Books; Posner, R.A. (2001), 
Antitrust Law, University of Chicago Press, 2
nd
 ed. 
3
 On some recent literature in the US on this topic see, among others, the contributions of: Blair, R. and D. 
Sokol (2012), ‘The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach’ Antitrust Law Journal 
78(2) 471-504; Hovenkamp, H. J., ‘Distributive Justice and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust’ (August 3, 2011). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1873463; Huffman, M., 
‘Neo-Behavioralism?’ (December 23, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1730365 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1730365; Kirkwood, J.B and R.H. Lande (2008), ‘The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency’, Notre Dame Law Review 84(1) 191-243; Orbach, 
B. (2011), ‘The Antitrust Consumer Welfare paradox’ Journal of Competition Law & Economics 7 133-164; 
Pitofsky, R. (2008) How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis 
on U.S. Antitrust, Oxford University Press; Stucke, M. (2012) ‘Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals’ Boston College 
Law Review 53(2) 551-629; Wright, J. (2012), ‘Abandoning Antitrust Chicago Obsession: The Case for 
Evidence-Based Antitrust, Antitrust Law Journal 78(1) 241-271. 
4
 See, for instance, among many excellent recent studies, Akman, P. (2009) ‘Consumer Welfare and Article 102 
EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ World Competition 32 71-90; Akman, P. (2009), ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul 
of Article 82EC’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29(2) 267-303; Andriychuk, O. (2010), ‘Dialectical Antitrust: 
An Alternative Insight into the Methodology of the EC Competition Law Analysis in a period of Economic 
Downturn’, European Competition Law Review, 31(4) 155–164; Andriychuk, O. (2010), ‘Rediscovering the 
Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process’ European Competition Journal 6(3) 
575-610; Buttigieg, E. (2009), Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest. A Comparative Analysis 
of US Antitrust Law and EC Competition Law, Kluwer; Drexl, J., Kerber, W. Podszun, R. (eds.) (2010), 
Competition Policy and the Economic Approach – Foundations and Limitations, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; 
Nihoul, P. (2012), ‘Freedom of Choice’: The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in European Competition Law’ 
Concurrences 3-2012 55-70; Lovdahl-Gormsen, L. (2007), ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and 
Consumer Welfare in the Modernization of Article 82 EC’ European Competition Journal 3(2) 329-344; 
Odudu, O. (2010), ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(3) 599-613; 
Townley, C. (2009) Article 81 EC and Public Policy, Oxford: Hart Pub.; van Rompuy, B. (2012), Economic 
Efficiency: The Sole Concern of Modern Antitrust Policy? Non-Efficiency Considerations under Article 101 
TFEU, Kluwer; Zimmer, D. (eds.) (2012), The Goals of Competition Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
(including many thoughtful contributions). 
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ideological connotations, probably as a result of the large political consensus in Europe on 
the benefits of active competition law enforcement, there is still disagreement over the role 
and extent of welfare analysis in EU competition law, as opposed to a rights and principles-
based approach, and the interplay between the different goals of competition law, assuming 
that one adheres to goals pluralism. A related topic, which will not be examined 
systematically in this study, is the interplay between competition law and other policies of the 
European Union and that between competition law and public policy considerations at the 
level of Member States in the multi-level governance system of the EU, which may also raise 
the issue of the goals of EU competition law, albeit this time, from one external to 
competition law perspective.  
 
The topic presents a theoretical interest, in view of the various normative perspectives 
advanced on the goals of competition law (II). The normative conundrum that follows is not 
clarified by positive EU competition law, as the EU Courts have embraced different goals 
and the drafting of the EU Treaties requires that EU competition law provisions should be 
interpreted in accordance with the rest of the EU Treaties’ provisions, hence leading to the 
emergence a more holistic EU competition law (III). More importantly, contrary to what is 
often advanced in competition law literature, determining the goals of EU competition law 
will not necessarily provide any information on the content and evolution of competition law; 
hence the view defended in this study that the quest for the goals of competition law may 
prove in the end a meaningless exercise. Indeed, social goals affecting the interpretation and 
implementation of EU competition law are evolving and are highly dependent on the 
institutional and political context. Goals are intermediated through the mechanism of 
institutional choice: they involve decisions over the right institutional process, be this, the 
market, the political process, the courts and competition authorities, the EU or the national 
levels. In the end, decisions over goals are decisions over adequate institutions. The last part 
of this study examines the hidden institutional dimension of the quest for the objectives of 
EU competition law. I argue that the debate should refocus on the core issue of the adequate 
institutional framework, by employing the tool of comparative institutional analysis (IV). 
 
 
II. A normative perspective on the objectives of EU competition law 
 
Most discussions on the goals of competition law take a normative perspective, based 
on some philosophical pre-commitment or prior beliefs on certain values and personal taste, 
occasionally taking support in the legislative history or the interpretation of the competition 
law provisions by the courts and competition authorities in past decisional practice. To 
summarize a long and complex debate there is an opposition between, on the one side, those 
advancing the existence of a plurality of objectives for competition law and, on the other side, 
those supporting the thesis of one aim/objective: economic welfare or more broadly welfare. 
The latter is based on the belief that the only thing we can be sure about people’s preferences 
is that they want to maximize their utility, redefined as welfare in order to solve the 
measurability problem to which Pareto
5
 and Robbins
6
 hinted to, because of the difficulty of 
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inter-personal comparisons of utility
7
. New welfare economics attempted to construct a 
theoretical framework based on ordinal utility without relying on interpersonal utility 
comparisons. This provides, according to them, the soundest ethical basis for the organization 
and operation of social institutions
8
. Critics to this approach claim the weaknesses of the 
concept of economic welfare to comprehend all the dimensions of human motivation and 
choice and they advance various other objectives allegedly pursued by EU competition law. 
These two approaches are not as dramatically different as it is usually presented, for the 
simple reason that both views may be inspired by some form of utilitarian or welfarist 
argument and that, with some exceptions, non-economic welfare goals may be analysed in 
broader welfare or well-being terms. Finally, some authors oppose any approach that would 
assess the aims of EU competition law even in broadest welfarist terms, advancing a purely 
deontological argument for competition (regardless of outcomes) or arguing that all outcomes 
resulting from a spontaneous competitive order are, as a matter of principle, normatively 
superior than any other outcome. I will first examine the narrow economic welfare 
perspective, before delving into non-economic welfare or non-welfare oriented approaches to 
competition law. 
 
A. The economic welfare perspective 
 
The view that competition law should aim to promote some form of economic welfare 
is intrinsically linked to the influence of economics and in particular welfare economics, 
consumer theory and related fields in competition law analysis. This influence may be 
explained by the more economics-oriented approach that has been gradually introduced in EU 
competition law with the implementation of the EU merger regulation in the 1990s, the 
reform of the law on vertical restraints and cooperation agreements in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and most recently the discussion over a more effects-based economic approach 
in the implementation of the abuse of dominance provisions of EU competition law
9
. 
 
As it was the case in US antitrust law, the debate focuses on the importance of 
concepts such as “economic efficiency”, “total” or “consumer welfare” at the adjudicative, 
doctrinal and jurisprudential levels of legal reasoning in EU competition law
10
.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
641. 
7
 For a critical analysis of the development of utility theory and interpersonal comparisons of utility, see, among 
others, Stigler, G. (1950), ‘The Development of Utility Theory I’ The Journal of Political Economy 58(4) 307-
327; Stigler, G. (1950), ‘The Development of Utility Theory II’ The Journal of Political Economy 58(5) 373-
396;  
8
 See, for instance, the analysis of the utility theory of Marshall by Parsons, T. (1937), The Structure of Social 
Action, Vol. 1, New York: The Free Press, pp. 134-141 noting the ethical aims of the theory: “the development 
of character”. 
9
 Starting with the EAGCP,, Report on an Economic Approach to Article 82 EC (July 2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf 
10
 I follow here R. Dworkin’s categorization of four stages in legal reasoning: R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes 
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 9-21. Dworkin distinguishes the semantic stage (which relates to the general 
assumptions and practices people share over the concept of law- e.g. criterial, interpretive, natural kind)), the 
jurisprudential stage (the development of a theory of law that is appropriate given the theorist’s answer at the 
semantic stage, in other words the values inspiring a specific legal practice), the doctrinal stage (constructing an 
account of the truth conditions of propositions of law in the light of the values identified in the jurisprudential 
stage) and the adjudicative stage (where judges or decision-makers adopt propositions of law based on the 
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proponents of an economic efficiency approach distinguish between Pareto efficiency and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  If one focuses on efficiency in consumption
11
, Pareto efficiency 
requires allocating goods between consumers so that it would not be possible by any 
reallocation to make people better off without making anybody else worse off. The Potential 
Pareto Improvement Criterion (or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) advances that if the magnitude of 
the gains from moving from one state of the economy to another is greater than the 
magnitude of the losses, then social welfare is increased by making the move even, if no 
actual compensation is made
12
. According to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an outcome is efficient 
if those that are made better off can, potentially, compensate those that were made worse off, 
with the resulting outcome still being Pareto optimal. The winners should, in theory, be able 
to compensate the losers, but there is no requirement that compensation should be effectively 
paid. 
The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is based on the following two fundamental theorems of 
welfare economics
13
: 
 
“The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals 
and firms are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals 
and producers are selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conclusions reached at the doctrinal stage). For example, the economic efficiency versus justice debate that 
permeates the question of the objectives of competition law belongs to the jurisprudential stage as it refers to the 
values that should provide content to the principle of coherence in legal interpretation. We have focused 
elsewhere on the interaction of economics and the law at the doctrinal and adjudicative stage: Lianos, I. (2009) 
‘Lost in translation? Towards a theory of economic transplants’, Current Legal Problems 62(1) 346-404. This 
study will mainly focus on the jurisprudential stage, although as I will further explain, and probably contrary to 
Dworkin’s view, there is a considerable interplay and mutual dependence between the jurisprudential and 
adjudicative stages, as in reality the values pursued by the specific legal system are function of a comparative 
institutional analysis performed at the adjudicative stage. However, for the adepts of a normative perspective in 
EU competition law, the two stages are clearly separated, with the adjudicative stage being locked in to 
decisions made at the jurisprudential stage. 
11
 One could advance a growth-related theory of competition law emphasizing the supply side, instead of the 
demand side (consumers). There is evidence that competition increases the chances of innovation and growth: 
Arrow, K (1962) ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions’, in (R. Nelson ed.) The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, NBER (noting that a monopolist that is 
not exposed to actual or potential competition has less incentive to invest in R&D than a firm in a competitive 
industry); Spence, M. (1984) ‘Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance’, Econometrica 52 101-
122; Dutz, M. & A. Hayri (2000) ‘Does More Intense Competition Lead to Higher Growth?’ (World Bank 
Working Paper No. 2320); Aghion, Ph. M. Dewatripont & P. Rey (1999), ‘Competition, Financial Discipline 
and Growth’, Review of Economic Studies 66 825-852; On the contrary, Schumpeterian models of growth argue 
that competition does not lead to growth. There are a lot of variants of this doctrine from the narrower (that we 
need big firms to generate innovation) to the broader (that industrial policies should take precedence to 
competition polices or that too much competition is bad for growth). See, however, Aghion, Ph. & R. Griffith 
(2005), Competition and Growth: Reconciling Theory and Evidence, MIT Press (noting that the greatest rate of 
innovation is observed in industries where the two main firms are technologically neck-and-neck. In these 
instances the incentive to innovate and thus to escape competition is the greatest). 
12
 Hicks, J.R. (1939). ‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics’  Economic Journal 49(196) 696–712; Kaldor, 
N. (1939) ‘Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility’ Economic Journal 49(145) 549–52 
13
 See, Blaug, M. (2007) ‘The Fundamental Theorems of Modern Welfare Economics, Historically 
Contemplated’, History of Political Economy 39(2) 185-207. 
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can be supported via the competitive mechanism, provided appropriate lump sum 
taxes and transfers are imposed on individuals and firms”. 
 
Contemporary economists do not rely on the First Fundamental Theorem as 
externalities, market failures, and imperfect competition are almost universally recognized, 
yet, the Second Fundamental Theorem implies that if a particular state of the economy is 
judged to be desirable, it may be achieved through lump-sum transfers, hence separating 
efficiency from distributive justice. Following the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency, 
economic policy recommendations should be determined by efficiency, distribution 
remaining a problem for the political realm (the separability thesis)
14
.  
 
 The construction of welfare economics as a “scientific” discipline inspired by logical 
positivism led to some stark methodological choices and a narrowing down of the accepted 
methods of economic inquiry
15
. In contrast to the idea of utilitarianism that promoting the 
sum of pleasure of the many should become the aim of public policy and to its hopes that all 
experiences of pleasure would prove to be measurable on a single scale, valid for all people, 
such that pleasures could be added across different individuals and across time, welfarism 
abandoned the hedonic concept of utility for its representation as a preference ordering. The 
concept of preference is itself interpreted in terms of choice and represented by utility 
functions, a numerical representation of a preference ordering that attaches a number to each 
possible bundle of goods so that a higher number represents a higher rank of preference. In 
contrast to traditional utilitarianism, which had assumed the existence of an absolute cardinal 
measure of pleasure across individuals (making possible interpersonal comparisons of 
utility), expected utility functions are cardinal in so far as they measure the extent to which 
one bundle of goods is preferred to another for an individual (hence not providing an index 
that is interpersonally comparable).  
 
As preferences represent comparative evaluations (choice), utility is deprived of 
substantive content: it does not denote, as in the utilitarian framework, an expected advantage 
or satisfaction of desire(s). It is instead purely formal and instrumental. Ordinal utility theory 
places restrictions on preference ordering with a number of axioms: (i) among the alternatives 
they believe to be available, it is assumed that agents will choose one that is at the top of their 
preference ranking, so that any two bundles of commodity can always be compared and 
ranked. It is also assumed that households have taken the time for evaluating alternative 
commodity bundles and can make decisions on the preference ordering of these bundles 
(completeness), (ii) if A is preferred to B and B to C, then A should be preferred to C. 
(transitivity), (iii) whether an agent prefers A to B remains stable across contexts (context-
                                                          
14
 The separability between questions of economic efficiency and issues of distribution has been criticized by L. 
Robbins who advanced the view that there is a distinction between normative and positive economics but that 
economists should avoid value-laden policy recommendations, without making explicit their normative 
predispositions: see, Robbins, L. (1981) ‘Economics and Political Economy’ American Economic Review 71 1-
10. For a position justifying Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical compensation, and thus the separability thesis, from an 
ethical and political perspective, see, Posner, R.A. (1980), ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication’, Hofstra Law Review 8 487-507 efficiency as a moral criterion); Posner, 
R.A. (1979) ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’, Journal of Legal Studies 8 103-140. 
15
 Milonakis, D. and B. Fine (2009), From Political Economy to Economics, Routledge noting the implosion of 
principle in economics but the explosion of the application of their model in other social sciences. 
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independence). An additional axiom often invoked is that more of a commodity is preferred 
to less (nonsatiation), the assumption being that the commodity is desirable. In conclusion, 
preferences are always comparative and cannot be defined in terms of well-being. 
 
Households act in order to maximize their utility. This involves the reconciliation of 
their preference ordering (or utility function) with their given budget (income). The budget 
constraint, along with the agent’s preferences, provide the necessary information required to 
determine the consumption bundle that would maximize the agent’s utility up to a tangency 
point, which indicates that there is no possibility of increasing utility by moving along the 
budget constraint. This theoretical maximum is however difficult to reach as consumers’ 
tastes frequently change and prices as well; hence, the agents will constantly adjust their 
purchase to reflect these changes. It is important to note here that economists assume that 
decisions are always reached by comparing additional benefits to additional costs at each 
instance of decision-making, what is called marginal analysis or marginalism. Hence, the 
utility is only marginal, as the choice over this or other alternative of consumption is 
marginal. The utility maximization hypothesis is axiom-based, as it is assumed that choices 
will be determined by preferences and budget constraints.  
 
An alternative way of looking to utility is to adopt a revealed preference theory 
approach, which infers the preferences of consumers from their actual choices. The welfare 
analysis usually performed in competition law links actions to choices, choices to preferences 
and preferences to welfare. Revealed preference theory assumes that the satisfaction of the 
actual preferences of agents for bundles of products, according to their preference ordering, 
constitutes well-being. From a welfarist approach to competition law, the goal of competition 
law enforcement should be to enable the agents/households to satisfy these (revealed) 
preferences at the lower cost for them. Assuming that households are consumers (final and 
intermediary) and producers/suppliers/shareholders, the objective should be to ensure the 
maximum level of efficiency for all these categories. This includes allocative efficiency, for 
example, the possibility for consumers to pay a price that corresponds to their willingness to 
pay or in some cases less than their willingness to pay (leading to consumer surplus). It 
should also include the possibility for producers to use production processes that yield the 
highest output levels for a given set of inputs or for consumers the possibility to enjoy 
innovative products and services, what is usually referred to as dynamic efficiency.  Finally, 
one should take into account the scale efficiencies producers may enjoy, enabling them to 
reduce the production costs of a specific good (productive efficiency) and thus to raise their 
surplus in the sense that if a producer has a willingness to sell, and the market price for a 
good is above that price, then they would be able gain a surplus equal to the gap (producer 
surplus).   
 
The application of the Kaldor-Hicks standard in judging the efficiency of a change 
from one competitive situation to another in competition law, takes the form of a “total 
welfare standard”. The latter is a measure that aggregates the surplus of different groups in 
the economy (e.g. producers, consumers) and measures the welfare consequences of the 
change. It is important that total (consumer and producer) surplus increases, even if the 
surplus of one of the groups (consumers or producers) diminishes. In conformity to the 
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second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, only the size of the economic pie matters, 
not its distribution among each group. EU competition law seems, however, to emphasize 
more consumer surplus than producer surplus, and goes as far as accepting that wealth 
transfers from final consumers to producers might be a matter of concern for competition law 
enforcement
16
. Furthermore, article 101(3) TFEU provides that consumers/users should be 
awarded a fair share of the possible efficiency gains that are claimed by a producer and 
resulting from an anticompetitive agreement. For instance, it would be impossible to justify 
under Article 101(3) an agreement that affects consumers because it leads to higher prices, 
lower output, less innovation or less quality, even if on aggregate that agreement provides 
important efficiency gains to the producers enabling them to theoretically compensate the 
consumers for their losses
17
. This indicates that EU competition law may not adopt an 
economic efficiency-based approach (Kaldor-Hicks) and that issues of distribution play an 
important role in EU competition law. 
 
In addition to the point previously made that EU competition law does not adhere to 
an economic efficiency/total welfare standard view, one may claim that there are strong 
normative arguments for opposing the implementation of such a standard in EU competition 
law.  
 
First, the Kaldor-Hicks compensation approach suffers from various fundamental 
problems that may preclude its practical application. The separability thesis advanced may be 
criticized for not taking into account the inevitable distributive effects of an economic 
efficiency criterion. The Second welfare theorem of economics denotes a status quo bias for 
the existing allocation of resources, deemed efficient. Yet, the existing resource allocation 
may be the product of an unjust initial distribution of income that may contravene principles 
of social justice, as these are defined by non-utilitarian theories of justice
18
. The proponents 
of the economic efficiency approach often advance that inequalities in the initial distribution 
may be addressed by the political system, which might decide to impose a lump sum tax 
compensating the losers and ensuring an equality of opportunity. The implicit assumption is 
that the tax system is a more efficient way of engaging in redistribution than the regulatory 
system
19
. However, one may reverse the order of these arguments and suggest instead that it 
is only if the question of fair and equitable income distribution is addressed by the political 
system that it may be legitimate for competition law to focus exclusively on economic 
efficiency. It is also important to take into account the inability of the EU to employ fiscal 
instruments to redistribute wealth across the Union. EU member States differ greatly in their 
                                                          
16
 See, our analysis, infra. 
17
 The trade-off between dynamic efficiency gains and static allocative efficiency gains in a total welfare context 
might be complicated. See our analysis infra. 
18
 See, for instance, the perspective of J. Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press 
introducing the idea that society should be conceived as a system of cooperation designed to advance the mutual 
advantage of each members and of each of its members. Individuals should be recognized primary social goods, 
as rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, chosen by the parties to the social contract 
from an original position behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing anything about their 
future position. 
19
This is related to the discussion over the comparison between taxation by regulation and direct taxation, the 
latter being considered more efficient, under very specific conditions, see Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz (1976), 
‘The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation’ Journal of Public Economics 6 55-75. 
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levels of wealth, a disparity that is currently increasing as a result of the expansion of the EU 
to the east and the important economic crisis affecting southern Europe
20
. McDonnell and 
Faber also note that powerful firms are not randomly distributed across Europe, and hence 
“producer surplus is likely to accrue primarily to the most powerful and wealthy EU 
members, increasing existing wealth disparities at the margins”21. Efficient rules that would 
focus only on total surplus with no attention to the allocation of that surplus between 
producers and consumers (which is excluded by efficiency analysis as a distributive justice 
issue) will tend to pump wealth in the "wrong" direction
22
. In the absence of adequate 
resources and a competence for the EU to mitigate these distributional consequences across 
the Union [in view of the absence of an EU corporate income tax and the low wealth transfer 
from rich to poor Member States (assuming that the qualification of “rich” and “poor” States 
represents average disposable income for consumers)], there may be a less strong argument 
for the separability thesis in the EU than in jurisdictions, such as the United States, which 
dispose the adequate fiscal instruments to pursue redistribution at the federal level. 
 
In addition to these practical difficulties for the application of a total welfare standard 
in EU competition law there are also a number of theoretical objections that raise doubts on 
the desirability of the Kaldor-Hicks economic efficiency total welfare standard.  
 
Second, Scitovsky showed the cyclical (or double switching) problem faced by this 
type of economic efficiency analysis as the standard uses ex post results to evaluate policy 
changes: if a movement from one point to another in a utility space can be shown to be Pareto 
improving according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, then it may be shown that a movement 
back to the original point is also Pareto improving
23
. Policy options cannot therefore be 
ranked unambigiously, “because rankings depend upon the distribution of wealth, which in 
turn depends upon policy”24. 
 
Third, the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion relates to the preferences of each agent 
for different outcomes or states of affairs. Yet, the test only takes account of the preferences 
of the specific set of agents to which it is applied, by exploring their revealed preferences, 
without paying any attention to other affected parties. This is accentuated by the fact that 
competition analysis is limited to the participants of a relevant market (as a result of the 
partial equilibrium analysis performed) and does not include all the other markets or sectors 
of the economy that may be affected by the restriction of competition and/or the remedial 
action adopted by the competition authority
25
. This may be particularly important if the 
                                                          
20
 McDonnel, B. & D.A. Farber (2003) ‘Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always Optimal?’ Antitrust Bulletin Fall 
2003 807-835, p. 825. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Cowen, T. (1993) ‘The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty’ Economics and Philosophy 9 253-269, 
spec. pp. 254-258. 
24
 Ibid., p. 255. 
25
 The extreme version of this argument may take the form of the theory of second best: Lipsey, R.G. & K. 
Lancaster (1956-1957) ‘The General Theory of Second Best’ The Review of Economic Studies, 24(1) 11–32, 
suggesting that government interventions to make a market more competitive, may not make consumers better 
off, as if the first best solution is not realized (e.g. perfect competition), then there is nothing to choose between 
the second or the third best. This is contrary to the belief in welfare economics that if first best is unattainable, 
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change in the competitive conditions that has to be assessed may bring new parties into 
existence (consumers or firms), or exclude others in other relevant markets or economic 
sectors, for which there is no account of their preferences.  
 
Fourth, the Potential Pareto Improvement criterion has been used to argue that 
increases in output (shifts in the production possibilities frontier) are an improvement because 
they are potentially welfare enhancing, assuming that the production (or consumption) of 
more commodities is welfare enhancing. Indeed, by definition, more production of something 
leads to more units of that something to be distributed (with the result that allocative 
efficiency is improved). Yet, the question arises if that increases the "right" output mix. The 
decision over the proper mix of goods and productive inputs involves some normative 
judgments over what constitutes “good” or “bad consumption”. For example, producing more 
industrial waste might not be a “good” commodity for a welfare perspective, in view of the 
possible lasting effects of such waste on the environment and quality of life standards. 
 
Fifth, revealed preferences theory assumes that preferences are always exogenous, 
hence they should be the starting point of the analysis. Yet, this view may be criticized. 
Preferences often depend on factors that should be irrelevant, such as how is the choice 
framed. Behavioural economics research provides evidence of biases
26
, indicating that the 
context of choice may have an important role to play in the way consumers develop their 
preferences (framing effects)
27
. Preferences may be based on imperfect information, such as 
the mis-estimation of small probability events or a tendency to over-estimate one’s 
probability of success
28
. People may also prefer something they already have to something 
they do not have (endowment effect), they may discount the near future at a higher rate than 
the distant future, they may have different discount rates for different kinds of outcomes 
(hence affecting their consumption decisions), or they may be risk averse when they make 
decisions, preferring the status quo to a change that would promote their welfare
29
. 
Preferences are also formed within a specific social context and may be endogenous, in the 
sense that they depend on the individual’s personal history and the social and cultural context 
in which the individual is integrated
30
. Furthermore, one should not exclude that a decision, 
even if a priori Pareto efficient, may lead to a change in the composition and/or preferences 
of the population or even of individual agents, thus leading to a new population or to an agent 
with a different set of preferences than those initially considered. Inter-generation effects 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
then second best may be attained, even if some Pareto optimality conditions are not satisfied (Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency). In view of the fact that the competition law assessment is partial and refers to a specific market, 
ignoring all other effects to non-relevant markets, the criticism of the theory of the second best may have a 
devastating effect in competition law. 
26
 OFT 1224, What does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, March 2010, accessible at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf  
27
 Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1986), Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, Journal of Business 
Studies 59 251-278. 
28
 Cowen, T. (1993), op. cit., p. 261. 
29
 Kahneman, D. & Thaler, R.H. (2006) ‘Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility’ Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 20 221-234; Samuelson, S. & R. Zeckhauser (1988), ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1  7-59; see also Thaler, R. (1980) ‘Toward a Positive Theory of 
Consumer Choice’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 1 39-60. 
30
 For an interesting critique, based on the role of culture, see V.H. Storr (2013), Understanding the Culture of 
Markets, London & New York: Routledge. 
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should also been taken into account in cases involving some lasting effects (e.g. 
environmental or sustainable development objectives as opposed to lower prices for actual 
consumers), thus raising the complexity and difficulty of cost benefit analysis in this 
context
31
. 
 
Sixth, preferences may not relate to outcomes (for example the quantity and quality of 
goods exchanged) but to the process of achieving these outcomes (e.g. fairness, competition). 
There is no doubt that sport fans would enjoy more a fair competition with no record 
performances than one profoundly distorted by doping competition, which will lead to record 
performances. The point made relates to the indifference of welfare economics on the content 
of preferences: “by taking preferences to be total comparative evaluations (as they must if 
preferences are to determine choices), economists allow preferences to be influenced by 
everything agents regard as relevant to their choices, whether these be moral or aesthetic 
considerations, ideals, whims, fantasies, or passions of all sorts”32. Yet, this ignores all 
instances in which preferences relate to a process rather than an outcome. 
 
Seventh, there is an inherent problem in inferring preferences by choice, as standard 
revealed preference theory does. This limits preferences to those alternatives among which 
the agents choose in fact: when there is no choice, there is no preference
33
. This inference 
may prove far-fetched. Furthermore, as it has been noted by Daniel Hausman, “preferences 
cannot be defined by choice, because the same choice reflects different preferences when 
beliefs differ”34. Preferences can be inferred from choices only given premises regarding 
beliefs
35
. Inferences concerning preferences also depend on assumptions about the constraints 
faced by the particular agents and the way they would be able to individualize the 
alternatives. Expected utility theory relates preferences over payoffs of actions, enabling us to 
make inferences about preferences from expected advantage, under the assumption that the 
total subjective ranking of alternatives coincides with the agents’ ranking in terms of 
expected advantage. Yet, the idea that one preference ordering may reflect the person’s 
interests, represent her welfare and describe her actual choice and behaviour has been 
criticized for not accounting for situations when choice of alternatives can be explained by 
commitment, under which an agent acts without expecting a benefit (for example, she may be 
motivated by altruism or moved by malevolent purposes)
36
 
 
Eighth, it is wrong to assume that the satisfaction of revealed preferences will 
necessarily promote welfare as people often prefer what is worse for their welfare in the long 
run because “their preferences are evil, ignorant, adaptive, or otherwise misshapen”37. 
Responding to this criticism some authors advanced the need for a laundered set of 
                                                          
31
 Cowen, T. (1993), op. cit., pp. 258-260. 
32
 Hausman D.M. (2012), Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, Cambridge University Press. 
33
 Ibid., p. 27. 
34
 Ibid., pp. 27-28. Hausman gives the example of Romeo choosing death to life under the mistaken belief that 
Juliet was dead. But of course, he does not prefer death to life with Juliet: “(h)is choice does not reveal his 
preference, because he is mistaken about what the alternatives are among which he is choosing”. 
35
 Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added. 
36
 Sen, A. (1982), Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Harvard University Press. 
37
 Adler M.D. and E.A. Posner (2006), New Foundations of Cost Benefit Analysis, Harvard University Press, p. 
33  
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preferences, removing the lack of information, cognitive biases, or anti-social preferences 
(non-ideal preferences) from the welfare calculus
38
. However, if this is the case, actual 
preferences cannot be a proxy for informed and laundered self-interested preferences. 
 
Ninth, some philosophers have criticized the implicit assumption of economists that 
satisfying preferences leads to welfare by distinguishing between welfare defined as a 
“wholehearted and successful pursuit of valuable relationships and goals”, and the agent’s 
feeling of satisfaction for achieving her preferences, whatever these might be
39
.  
 
For these reasons, some recent studies have advanced the view that although welfare 
cannot be defined as the satisfaction of revealed preferences, preferences may be considered 
at least as evidence of well-being among other types of evidence
40
. This view recognizes that 
relying on people’s revealed preferences might be more informative on their well-being than 
relying on the judgment of government officials, judges, legislators or moral philosophers. 
 
An alternative approach to that of actual or laundered revealed preferences is to 
construct an objective list of preferences (or capabilities) that might reasonably be expected 
to promote an agent’s well-being41. Some recent work of the OECD has taken a multi-
dimensional view of well-being, adopting an objective-list approach identifying a number of 
dimensions of well-being, including material living standards (income, consumption and 
wealth), health, education, personal activities including work, political voice and governance, 
social connections and relationships, environment (present and future conditions) and 
insecurity of an economic or physical nature
42
. Although it is clear that wealth is only one 
factor among the many determining well-being, it is difficult to imagine how such an 
approach could be incorporated in competition law adjudication and how information on all 
these factors could be collected and assessed by competition authorities or courts on a case by 
case basis. 
 
Other welfarist approaches question ordinalism and its insistence on the order of 
preferences, supporting instead a hedonic approach, close to that of the old utilitarianism of 
Bentham, that would measure the happiness of agents by evaluating the way that person feels 
throughout her life (subjective experience of life)
43
. However, the application of happiness 
                                                          
38
 Ibid., p. 34. 
39
 Raz, J. (2004), ‘The Role of Well Being’ Ethics 18 269-294. 
40
 Hausman D.M. (2012), op. cit., pp. 93-102. 
41
 See, for instance, Sen, A. (1985) Commodities and Capabilities, North-Holland advancing the moral 
significance of individuals’ capability of achieving the kind of lives they have reason to value. For a different 
objective list approach see, Nussbaum, M. (2011), Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, 
Harvard University Press. For Sen, well-being depends on the agent using these capabilities, while for 
Nussbaum this is not essential. 
42
 See, the OECD, Better Life Initiative, accessible at http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/, last accessed on 
November 1
st, 2012. The OECD’s work follows the work of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress (J. Stiglitz, A. Sen, J.P. Fitoussi), Report by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, accessible at http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf , last accessed on November 1
st
, 2012. 
43
 Layard, R (2005), Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Allen Lane. On the measurement of 
happiness see, See, Kahneman, D. (1999) ‘Objective Happiness’, in Kahneman, D. et al. (eds.), Well Being: The 
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 3-25. 
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studies in the competition law context also runs to the same practical difficulties than the 
objective list multi-factored analysis, with the additional limitation that measuring the change 
in happiness following a specific anticompetitive conduct would prove an extremely difficult 
or almost impossible task, under the current circumstances, unless subjective well-being is 
determined by contingent valuation surveys, as it is the case in some procedures of cost 
benefit analysis. Yet, it would be very difficult to assess subjectively reported data on the 
moment-by-moment effect of a specific anticompetitive practice during the adjudicative 
process, as, by definition, competition law investigations are initiated many years after the 
specific conduct was implemented. One might also raise important objections to happiness 
surveys, including measurement problems in the multi-cultural environment of the EU, as the 
concept of “happiness” may not have the same meaning in all Member States. Additional 
concerns include the ethical problems raised by the “hedonic engineering” of the State 
required in this case, or because of the assumption of the “aggregative understanding of 
happiness” (the assumption that happiness of a whole life is “the sum of the happiness of its 
individual moments”), which is not a view shared by all cultures, and more generally the one-
dimensional view of happiness advanced by these authors
44
. In any case, even if measuring 
happiness was practically possible and ethically acceptable, the decision-maker should also 
incorporate in the analysis the risk of forecasting errors, cognitive heuristics and the possible 
discrepancy between predicted happiness and experienced happiness or well-being. 
 
In conclusion, an economic welfare criterion based on revealed preferences runs to a 
series of difficulties and moral objections. The effort to adopt a multi-factored conception of 
welfare, based on an objective list approach or on a hedonic welfare (happiness) perspective 
may push the adjudicative process beyond its limits and may also be, in some circumstances, 
ethically objectionable. 
 
B. The non-economic welfare view 
 
 Analysing in detail all the possible aims of EU competition law, other than economic 
welfare, considered by the competition authorities, courts and academic commentators is 
beyond the aims of this study
45
. Among these objectives, one may include economic 
democracy, fairness, the completion of the internal market, the principle of freedom of 
competition, the protection of a group of market actors, such as final consumers or small and 
medium undertakings. I will examine, among these objectives, those that have exercised a 
certain influence in EU competition law discourse. I will focus on the political (economy) 
objective of market integration, that of the protection of consumers and the principle of the 
freedom to compete. The discussion will show that these objectives may also be incorporated 
to a certain extent to an economic welfare/well-being approach. However, there is a residual 
non-welfare related view of the objectives of EU competition law that would value the 
                                                          
44
 See, inter alia, the criticisms of Skidelsky, R. & E. Skidelsky (2012), How Much in Enough?, Allen Lane-
Penguin Books, pp. 96-123. 
45
 On the most popular objectives of competition law, see the survey of competition authorities prepared by the 
International Competition Network (2011), Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare – Setting the 
Agenda, accessible at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc857.pdf, last accessed 
November 1
st
, 2012. For a recent thoughtful discussion of the survey and the question of the aims of competition 
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protection of the competitive process for deontological, rather than for consequentialist 
reasons. 
 
1. The integration of the Internal Market 
 
The objective of market integration has of course marked considerably the history of 
EU competition law, and still does to this day. It is well known that territorial allocation, 
restrictions to exports or more generally restrictions to parallel trade are classified as 
restrictions of competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU, even if they do not produce 
any effects on final consumers
46
. They do not benefit from the de minimis rule
47
, they are 
excluded from the benefit of the block exemption regulations as hardcore restrictions and 
they have rarely been found to fulfil the conditions of the exception of article 101(3) TFEU
48
. 
A possible explanation of such a restrictive approach to any conduct that jeopardizes the 
principle of market integration is its significance as a political objective for the EU, the idea 
being that a common market will ultimately lead to political unification. Despite the 
important attraction of a deontological approach in this context, in recent years the EU courts 
have moved to a more pragmatic view of the objective of market integration and have 
employed reasoning that may be compatible with a welfare perspective.  
 
In Sot. Lélos Kai Sia v. GlaxoSmithKline, the CJEU examined the consequences of 
restrictions of parallel trade to consumers, before finding that they could constitute a 
restriction of competition under Article 102 TFEU. The Court noted that parallel exports of 
medicinal products from a Member State where the prices are low to other Member States in 
which the prices are higher “open up in principle an alternative source of supply to buyers of 
the medicinal products in those latter States, which necessarily brings some benefits to the 
final consumer of those products”49. Indeed, “the attraction of the other source of supply 
which arises from parallel trade in the importing Member State lies precisely in the fact that 
that trade is capable of offering the same products on the market of that Member State at 
lower prices than those applied on the same market by the pharmaceuticals companies” and 
“(a)t the same time […] parallel trade in medicines from one Member State to another is 
                                                          
46
 In Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, para. 118, the 
Court of First Instance highlighted that “the objective assigned to Article 101(1) TFEU, which constitutes a 
fundamental provision indispensable for the achievement of the missions entrusted to the Community, in 
particular for the functioning of the internal market is to prevent undertakings, by restricting competition 
between themselves or with third parties, from reducing the welfare of the final consumer of the products in 
question”.  The Court of Justice in Joined cases C-501/06 P, 513/06 P, 515/06 P and 519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline 
Services v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, para. 59, 62-64, reversed the judgment of the General Court on this 
issue and maintained the traditional position of EU competition law that restrictions to parallel imports are 
restrictive to competition by object. 
47
 Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence and Others [December 13, 2012], not yet 
published, para. 37 (“an agreement that may affect trade between Member States and that has an anti-
competitive object constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an 
appreciable restriction on competition”). 
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 See, however, Joined cases C-501/06 P, 513/06 P, 515/06 P and 519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services v. 
Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, where the Court accepted that restrictions to parallel trade may be justified by 
Article 101(3) TFEU. 
49
 Joined Cases C-468/06 to 478/06, Sot Lelos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline [2008] ECR I-7139, para. 54 
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likely to increase the choice available to entities in the latter Member State”50. The CJEU has 
also implicitly recognized in this case that restrictions of parallel trade lead to a presumption 
of negative effects on consumers and hence shift the burden of proof to the defendant, in the 
context of Article 102 TFEU, without it being necessary for the claimant to bring additional 
evidence as to the causal link between the specific conduct and consumer harm
51
. The CJEU, 
however, accepted that a restriction to parallel trade does not amount to an absolute 
presumption of consumer harm or a per se prohibition rule. The presumption of 
anticompetitive effects may still be rebutted by the defendant in limited circumstances: a 
company must be ‘in a position to take steps that are reasonable and in proportion to the need 
to protect its own commercial interests’.52 The full array of objective justifications may not 
apply in this case (only reasonable and proportionate protection of commercial interests)
53
, 
hence the possibility of dominant firms to justify restrictions on parallel trade is limited to 
circumstances where (a) State intervention is one of the factors liable to create the 
opportunities for parallel trade in the first place
54
 and (b) where a different interpretation of 
Article 102, rejecting any possibility of justification, would have left dominant firms only the 
choice ‘not to place its medicines on the market at all in a Member State where the prices of 
those products are set at a relatively low level’.55  
 
2. The protection of consumers 
 
According to the case law of the European Courts, one of the principal functions of EU 
competition law is to prevent “consumer harm”56. The European Commission has inferred 
from the role of “consumer harm” in the case law of the European Courts with regard to 
identifying the existence of a restriction of competition, that the principal goal of EU 
competition law is the protection of final or intermediary consumers
57
. The terminology 
employed in not always clear-cut. For example, in the Commission’s Guidance on its 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
                                                          
50
 Ibid., paras 55-56. 
51
 Ibid, paras 56-57 & 66. 
52
 Ibid, para 69. 
53
 The content of this concept is unclear. A restrictive definition of the concept will cover only a meeting 
competition defense, thus excluding the consideration of efficiency gains. The interpretation of this expression 
is not clear. See, Rousseva, E. (2006) ‘The Concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an Abuse of a Dominant 
Position: Can it Help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82?’ Competition Law Review 2(2) 27-72, p 33-
34 noting that “[…] the question is what a legitimate commercial interest of a dominant undertaking is: does this 
interest mean only a right of a dominant undertaking to survive on the market, i.e., to prevent its inefficient 
operation, or does it also mean a right to carry out a profit oriented policy? How does the prerogative of a 
dominant firm to protect its interest fit with the essential goal of competition to serve consumers’ interests? 
These are questions on which views diverge”. 
54
 Joined Cases C-468/06 to 478/06, Sot Lelos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline, op. cit., para 67. 
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56
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Dominant Undertakings, the concept of “consumer harm” is defined broadly as covering all 
practices restricting competition in the form of higher prices, lower innovation, and/or 
narrower consumer choice
58
. The Commission’s approach remains impressionistic: 
sometimes the guidance refers to “consumer harm” or “detriment to consumers”, other times 
to “consumer welfare”59: no definition is provided. The concept of consumer welfare has 
never been explicitly endorsed by the Court of Justice of the EU, and the distinction between 
consumer welfare, consumer surplus and consumer choice has been a matter of theoretical 
speculation
60
. Some authors argue that although the concept of consumer harm is used as a 
proxy for anticompetitive effects, it does not follow that the protection of the final consumer 
becomes the principal goal of competition law, as the consumer harm standard would be also 
compatible with a total (social) welfare approach
61
. 
 
The concept of “consumer harm” may include multiple dimensions, when one tries to 
extrapolate from it information on the goals of EU competition law:  
 
(i). In the economic jargon, the protection of consumer surplus constitutes an 
important part of the total welfare standard test. In this context, consumer surplus denotes the 
consumer part of the deadweight loss suffered as a result of the restriction of competition. For 
example, a price increase might lead to a volume effect that would be suffered by a certain 
category of consumers: because of the price increase some consumers will not be able to buy 
the product anymore, although past consumption patterns (revealed preferences) indicate that 
they would have preferred to do so, if the price had not increased. Under this narrow 
definition of consumer surplus, the overcharge paid by the consumers as a result of the price 
increase should not be of concern for competition law enforcement, as it constitutes a wealth 
transfer from the buyers to the sellers. The suppliers may be in a position to compensate 
(hypothetically, not actually) the loss that consumers have suffered while still being able to 
compensate with this wealth transfer their own losses following the volume effect (producer 
surplus). In this configuration the situation will be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. I will call this view 
of consumer harm: the “consumer surplus standard”.  
 
(ii). It is possible to decide that consumer surplus should be preserved at any cost and 
thus reject any compensation by the supplier that does not compensate actually and 
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 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
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effectively the losses incurred by these consumers as a result of the volume effect. For clarity 
purposes I will refer to this view as the “narrow consumer welfare standard”. 
 
(iii). There is also an argument to move beyond consumer surplus and include in the 
analysis the wealth transfer that consumers have incurred because of the overcharges 
following the restriction of competition. These may not only relate to higher prices but could 
cover any other parameter of competition, such as quality, variety, innovation. In this case, 
both the loss of consumer surplus and wealth transfers will be compared to the total 
efficiency gains pertaining to the supplier(s), thus enabling a cost benefit analysis of the 
effect of the conduct on the welfare of a specific group of market actors, direct and indirect 
consumers (not all market actors). The idea is that following the change from an equilibrium 
situation to another, the consumers of the specific product will benefit from a surplus and/or 
wealth transfer, in the sense that their ability to satisfy their preferences will increase. Again, 
for clarity purposes this standard will be referred to as the “extended consumer welfare 
standard”. 
 
(iv). Some authors also argue that competition authorities should aim to preserve an 
optimal level of “consumer choice”, defined as “the state of affairs where the consumer has 
the power to deﬁne his or her own wants and the ability to satisfy these wants at competitive 
prices”62. This concept seems broader than the concepts of “consumer surplus” and 
“consumer welfare” (the latter including consumer surplus + the wealth transfer because of 
the overcharge) as it may include other parameters than price, in particular “variety”. The 
same authors have used interchangeably the term of “consumer sovereignty”, which is 
defined as “the set of societal arrangements that causes that economy to act primarily in 
response to the aggregate signals of consumer demand, rather than in response to government 
directives or the preferences of individual businesses”63. Defining the “optimal degree” of 
consumer choice or consumer sovereignty and measuring it using some operational 
parameters seems however a daunting task. Consumer sovereignty may be conceptually 
appealing but may prove empirically weak to implement in competition law enforcement
64
. 
One might be obliged to go a step further and claim that consumer sovereignty can be 
preserved by the ability of consumers to influence the characteristics of the product bundle 
according to their own hypothetical revealed preferences. Hypothetical revealed preference 
theory defines an agent’s preferences in terms of what she would choose if she were able to 
choose, thus switching from actual to hypothetical choice
65
. The way this theory will work in 
practice is still a matter of speculation. It is clear that consumers are influenced in their 
decisions by “the context of choice, defined by the set of options under consideration. In 
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Protection Law’, Antitrust Law Journal  65 713-756, 715 . 
64
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particular, the addition and removal of options from the offered set can influence people’s 
preferences among options that were available all along”66. The firms with their marketing 
activities may, for example, shape endogenously consumer preferences by establishing an 
artificial selection process, “preferences are actually constructed—not merely revealed”67.  A 
greater focus on consumer sovereignty may thus, in some cases, lead to more intensive 
competition law intervention to establish the parameters of independent consumer choice and 
specific presumptions against commercial practices that deny the sovereignty of consumer 
choice. Open and contestable markets are a prerequisite for the empowerment of consumers. 
The consumer choice or consumer sovereignty standard may also accommodate the 
psychological aspect of the formation of these preferences, which is usually ignored in 
neoclassical price theory. The integration of behavioural economics and neuro-economics 
evidence in order to understand the consumers’ behaviour and build counterfactuals of 
hypothetical choice, based on predictions about what someone would choose in a specific 
choice context may also be one of the implications of this theory. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge the difficulty of engaging in the analysis of the 
long-term interest of the consumers for innovation and dynamic efficiency, as opposed to 
their short-term interest on lower prices and allocative efficience. As it is explained in a 
Canadian Bureau of Competition commissioned report on Innovation and Dynamic 
Efficiencies, 
“(t)o sustain innovative efforts, and thus support dynamic efficiency, firms do not 
expect to price at short-run marginal cost at every point in time and as a result some 
degree of allocative inefficiency may be inevitable. Motivating firms to make costly 
investments in R&D requires some prospect of “profit,” which as noted above is in 
the form of quasi-rents. In the absence of this positive return per unit of output sold, a 
firm would never be able to recoup its up-front investment in R&D, and would 
therefore have no incentive to undertake this investment. In other words, innovating 
firms anticipate a period of “incumbency” during which they are able to sell a product 
at a price exceeding not only the short-run marginal cost of production, but potentially 
also the price of existing products (if any) that do not incorporate the innovation. 
Consumers are willing to pay the higher price because they value the additional 
attributes embodied in the new or improved product sufficiently to pay a premium for 
it over other firms’ products”68. 
 
It follows that firms engaged in considerable research and development and other innovative 
activity may have low marginal costs but large fixed costs, which would lead them to price 
significantly above marginal costs in order to earn a competitive return in the long run. This 
might at first sight seem in contradiction with the static allocative efficiency concern for 
lower prices and will certainly deviate from the model of perfect competition. From a 
dynamic total welfare (Kaldor-Hicks) perspective, this sacrifice in static allocative efficiency 
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may be compensated by the benefits flowing from dynamic efficiency: higher profitability for 
the undertakings and new or better quality products for the consumers in the long run. 
However, increasing R&D does not necessarily lead to socially optimal innovation, as firms 
might have an excessive incentive (relative to that which is socially optimal) to seek to 
replace other firms (“the business stealing effect”)69. As it is noted by the same report, 
“consumers do not derive benefits from an additional dollar of R&D spending unless that 
dollar results in an increased likelihood of either a new product being developed or an 
existing product being made available for a lower price”70. In other words, from a non-total 
welfare (Kaldor-Hicks perspective) what is important is not to focus on R&D but on the 
innovation process and its outcomes. If only the welfare (short and long term) of consumers 
matters, then it is important to engage to a difficult exercise of distinguishing between R&D 
investment from which consumer will ultimately benefit from R&D investment, which will 
cost consumers more (in terms of allocative efficiency) than what it will provide them in 
terms of dynamic efficiency. Remote dynamic efficiencies may be discounted to some extent 
against short-term allocative efficiency losses (greater weight will be given to relatively more 
certain, short run, effects than uncertain dynamic efficiencies), thus leading to some bias in 
favour of allocative efficiency. In contrast, from a total welfare perspective, the cost to 
consumers of the increase of innovative activity is only one component of the analysis, the 
other being the profits that undertakings derive from the R&D activity long run. A change 
will thus be deemed Kaldor-Hicks efficient, even if there is over-investment on R&D, with 
regard to what is socially optimal, should the firms’s profitability increase as a result of this 
R&D effort, enabling it to potentially compensate the consumers’ loss. A Kaldor-Hicks total 
welfare approach could also look to the possible effects of innovation across markets, so not 
only the effects on consumers present in the specific relevant market, but also the effects on 
suppliers and consumers in other markets that will be affected by the innovative process, 
hence performing some form of general equilibrium analysis. General equilibrium analysis 
focuses on the economy as a whole and studies economic changes in all the markets of an 
economy simultaneously.  
 
In competition law, the aim of protecting consumers implies that the 
outcome/consequences of a specific practice on consumers matters, before any decision on 
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of this practice has been reached. A reduction of competitive 
rivalry, following the exclusion of a competitor or an agreement between two competitors to 
cooperate with each other, will not be found unlawful, if they do not also lead to a likely 
consumer harm or consumer detriment. A different approach would take a deontological 
perspective emphasizing competitive rivalry, irrespective of any actual or potential 
consequences of the specific practice/conduct on consumers. Effects may indicate empirical 
observable findings on the worsening, in terms of price or quality, of the situation of specific 
groups of consumers, following the adoption of the anticompetitive practice (actual effects). 
It may also refer to situations where there are no observable findings of effects on these 
groups of consumers but there is “a consistent theory of consumer harm” which is empirically 
validated: that is, “the theory of harm should be consistent with factual observations” (ex ante 
validation) and “that the market outcomes should be consistent with the predictions of the 
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theory” (ex post validation).71 The theory of harm has the objective to establish a relation of 
causality between the specific practice and the consumer detriment. One could think in terms 
of a probability-statement, that is, an evaluation of the “inferential soundness” of this 
relationship
72
, or in terms of relative plausibility of the specific consumer harm story
73
. 
 
It should be by now clear that some of the dimensions of consumer harm that we have 
previously examined are only concerned with efficiency or wealth maximization and adopt a 
Kaldor-Hicks total welfare standard [dimension (i) and (ii)], while others seem to go beyond 
efficiency and wealth maximization and integrate distributive justice concerns.  
 
The concept of distributive justice has multiple dimensions and its meaning has 
evolved through time
74
, but it is possible to define it as referring to the morally required 
distribution of shares of resources among members of a given group, either because of their 
membership to that group or in accordance with some measure of entitlement which applies 
to them in virtue of their membership. This is understood dynamically, that is across various 
situations in the specific jurisdiction. Rights and duties in distributive justice are thus “agent-
general”75, as they relate to a specific category of actors or group. 
 
As it was previously explained, the problem of distribution was relegated, because of 
the Kaldor-Hicks separability thesis, outside the realm of economics
76
. Hence, it may not 
constitute an objective for EU competition law for those advocating as its sole aim total 
welfare. The concept of “consumer harm” breaks with this tradition as it advances a view of 
competition law that would promote the interest of a group, consumers, to the detriment of 
other groups of actors (e.g. managers, shareholders, employees). According to the second 
condition of Article 101(3), “consumers”, a concept encompassing all direct and indirect 
users of the product, should receive a “fair share” of the efficiencies generated by the 
restrictive agreements in order for the agreement to benefit from the exception provided by 
article 101(3) TFEU. According to the Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article 
101(3),  
 
“The concept of ‘fair share’ implies that the pass-on of benefits must at least 
compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused to them by the 
restriction of competition found under Article [101(1)]. In line with the overall 
objective of Article [101] to prevent anti-competitive agreements, the net effect of the 
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agreement must at least be neutral from the point of view of those consumers directly 
or likely affected by the agreement. If such consumers are worse off following the 
agreement, the second condition of Article 101(3) is not fulfilled. The positive effects 
of an agreement must be balanced against and compensate for its negative effects on 
consumers. When that is the case consumers are not harmed by the agreement […] 
It is not required that consumers receive a share of each and every efficiency gain 
identified under the first condition. It suffices that sufficient benefits are passed on to 
compensate for the negative effects of the restrictive agreement. In that case 
consumers obtain a fair share of the overall benefits. If a restrictive agreement is 
likely to lead to higher prices, consumers must be fully compensated through 
increased quality or other benefits. If not, the second condition of Article [101(3)] is 
not fulfilled”77. 
 
Although the Commission accepts that consumer harm assessed under Article 101(1) 
TFEU (e.g. higher prices) might be compensated by some benefits provided by the 
anticompetitive agreement assessed under Article 101(3) (“efficiency gains”), they require 
that these benefits effectively (and not only hypothetically) and fully compensate the 
consumer harm in a way or another
78
. This does not amount to a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
standard but to a distributive justice standard. If the aim of EU competition law was to protect 
small and medium enterprises, we would have arrived to the same conclusion, in the sense 
that in this case small and medium firms’ owners would be favoured in relation to other 
groups of market actors.  
 
Protecting a specific group of market actors, such as consumers, may be supported by 
different theoretical foundations. Some have advanced an “original intent” style of argument, 
based on an historical analysis of the negotiation process of the European Treaties
79
. Others 
argue a public choice/political economy view based on the relative weakness of consumers’ 
lobbying compared to firms’ lobbying80 or the existence of biases against competition law 
enforcement action because of the institutional design of competition agencies (including 
how cases are brought to their attention)
81
. I have advanced elsewhere an argument in favour 
of a distributive justice objective in EU competition law based on the political and moral 
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philosophy of John Rawls
82
. Putting the argument simply, Rawls’ second principle of social 
justice advances that social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they 
are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society (the Difference Principle)”83. His justification of this principle of justice 
makes use of a thought experiment, an hypothetical situation called the “original position”, 
where individuals choose the basic principles of the society behind a “veil of ignorance”, that 
is without knowing their own position in the resulting social order as well as being ignorant 
of their personal identities. Under the Difference Principle, Rawls favours the establishment 
of institutions that would maximize the improvement of the "least-advantaged" group in 
society, by enabling these individuals to exercise control of wealth and other economic 
resources. By “least advantaged” group Rawls refers to “those belonging to the income class 
with the lowest expectations”84. Certainly, Rawls’ theory needs to be adjusted to the context 
of competition law. If one takes the criterion of income, it would not necessarily mean that 
competition law should protect consumers as opposed to shareholders or employees: in some 
circumstances (e.g. a luxury good market), final consumers may have a higher on average 
income than the suppliers of these goods, in particular if the latter are small and medium 
firms. Yet, in most circumstances, this is not the case. It may also be argued that final 
consumers are the “least advantaged” group when thinking about the competitive process, as 
they may be exploited by intermediary consumers (e.g. retailers) or suppliers, without the 
possibility for them to pass on these losses to anyone else in the market chain (unless, for 
example, in their capacity as suppliers in other relevant markets). All market actors are to a 
certain extent final consumers, while not all of them are necessarily suppliers, competition 
law being non-applicable to employment relations. Hence, the category of “final consumer” 
would be the one whose interests market actors would decide to promote in their original 
position, when designing the desirable social order behind a veil of ignorance. 
Notwithstanding this theoretical justification for a distributive justice principle that would 
promote the interest of final consumers, it is possible to weigh more the effects of an 
anticompetitive conduct on low income categories of final consumers, as opposed to 
efficiency gains passed on to a more wealthy category of final consumers (typically this may 
take the form of a price versus quality trade-off). This type of analysis of distributional 
effects is standard procedure in the context of regulatory impact assessments and could also 
be conducted in principle within the context of a competition law case
85
.  
 
An alternative distributive justice approach (this time not attached to the objective of 
protecting final consumers) would be to take a “egalitarian asset-based redistribution idea”, 
which would aim to enhance productivity by fixing a concentrated ownership of assets 
leading to perverse incentives, costly enforcement strategies and coordination failures, as it 
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has been recently advanced by theorists of the “new economics of inequality”86. Such an 
approach might involve active competition law enforcement in order to protect small and 
medium productive and innovative firms from being excluded from the market, with the aim 
to deconcentrate the use of productive assets in a market. 
 
 There is also a distinct tradition in welfare economics that incorporates explicitly 
distributive justice concerns
87
. Bergson and Samuelson advanced a social welfare function 
which is understood to depend on all the variables that might be considered as affecting 
welfare. The Social Welfare Function (SWF) does not take the strong moral/value judgment 
of Kaldor-Hicks, in that compensation is only hypothetical and does not provide a complete 
social ordering. It offers a more complete analysis, which is devised as means to weigh the 
utilities of different agents. The SWF framework is thus sensitive to fairness considerations. 
Economists who use the SWF approach are comfortable with interpersonal utility 
comparisons. Under normal conditions, they can estimate individuals’ “extended 
preferences” by looking to the ordinary preference data and use behavior or surveys to infer 
individuals’ preferences over bundles of attributes such as health, income, leisure, or 
environmental goods, hence making inferences about their “extended preferences”. From 
then on, they employ a “prioritarian social welfare function” in order to compare different 
arrangements of individual utility
88
. A “prioritarian” SWF gives greater weight to utility 
changes affecting individuals at lower utility levels, as compared to individuals at higher 
utility levels
89
. A cost benefit analysis with distributional weights would sum individual 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept amounts adjusted by weighting factors.   
 
3. Freedom to compete 
 
 A number of authors have recently examined the principle of “freedom to compete” 
as a distinct aim of EU competition law, in particular in the context of Article 102 TFEU
90
. 
Commentators analysing the case law of the EU Courts on Article 102 TFEU have employed 
different narratives in their attempt to synthesize the concept of abuse and explain the past 
case law and the trends of EU competition law enforcement in this area. Some oppose the old 
case law of the European Courts, which relies on the principle of the “freedom to compete” 
and the need to preserve a competitive market structure, to the more economics and welfare 
oriented approach chosen by the European Commission in its Enforcement Priorities 
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Guidance. The idea is that the turn of the Commission towards a “more economics approach” 
is antithetical to the case law and thus not legitimate
91
. The underlying assumption is that the 
principle of freedom of competition does not accommodate the “economic”, “effects-based” 
approach of the Commission’s Priorities Guidance, as (i) it is more “forms-based”, (ii) it does 
not look to economic efficiency and the possible efficiency gains resulting from the dominant 
undertaking’s conduct, (iii) it perceives the objective of the law as the protection of the 
interests of the competitors of the dominant undertaking, rather than the interests of the 
consumers, (iv) it does not require evidence of “consumer harm” for the application of 
Article 102 TFEU, but rather relies on the likely exclusion of competitors for the finding of 
an abuse. This is often opposed to the “economics” “effects-based” approach, which (i) 
requires evidence of consumer harm (directly or indirectly) for the application of Article 102 
TFEU, (ii) focuses on the likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct, rather than on its 
form, (iii) integrates efficiency considerations as a possible justification of the 
anticompetitive effects of consumers and (iv) perceives the objective of the law as the 
promotion of “consumer welfare”. 
 
The “freedom to compete” (Wettbewerbsfreiheit) view is often credited to the ideas of 
the ordoliberal school of thought
92
. The thesis advanced by some authors is that ordoliberal 
ideas influenced the drafting of the EC Treaty and the case law of the European Courts on the 
concept of abuse under Article 102 TFEU
93
. It is frequently alleged that the importance given 
to the concept of “economic freedom” in subsequent cases of the European Courts illustrates 
the influence of ordoliberal thought
94
. In essence, according to this view, for ordoliberals the 
principal aim of competition law is to protect the economic freedom of undertakings to 
compete on the marketplace. 
 
This is often interpreted as a deontological standpoint: the competitive process and the 
economic freedom of undertakings to participate to this competitive process must be 
preserved, irrespective of the effects of such competition on social welfare
95
. According to 
this view, the ordoliberals value individual economic freedom as an accompaniment of 
political freedom and autonomy. Their objective is to achieve an economic order, based on 
                                                          
91
 Lovdahl Gormsen, L (2010) ‘Why the European Commission’s Enforcement Priorities on Article 82 EC 
should be Withdrawn’, European Competition Law Review 31(2) 45-51; For a different perspective, see Akman, 
P (2010) ‘The European Commission's Guidance on Article 102 TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?’ Modern 
Law Review, 73(4) 605-630. 
92
 For a discussion see, Gerber, D.J, (1994) ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, 
Competition Law and the “New” Europe’, American Journal of Comparative Law 42 25-84; Rieter H. & M. 
Schmolz (1993), ‘The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938-45: pointing the way to a new economic order’, 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 1(1) 87-114; Möschel, W (1989) ‘Competition policy 
from an Ordo point of view’, in Peacock, A & H. Willgerodt (eds.), German Neo-Liberals and the Social 
Market Economy, London: Macmillan, pp. 142-159. For a translation in English of the views of one of the 
principal authors of the ordo-liberal group, see Eucken, W. (1992, first published in 1939), The Foundations of 
Economics – History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality, Berlin & New York: Springer. 
93
 Gerber, D (1994), op. cit., pp. 71-74; Gerber, D. (1998) Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: 
Protecting Prometheus, Clarendon Press. 
94
 Lovdahl Gormsen, L. (2007) ‘The Concept between Economic freedom and consumer welfare in the 
modernisation of Article 82 EC’, European Competition Journal 3(2) 329-344. 
95
 Andriychuk, O. (2010) ‘Rediscovering the spirit of competition: on the normative value of the competitive 
process’, European Competition Journal, 6(3) 575-610. 
   25 
 
  
the principle of competition, task which requires a positive agenda by the State to protect the 
competitive process from private economic power and political power. For these authors, the 
main concern for ordoliberals is “complete competition”, “that is competition in which no 
firm in a market has power to coerce other firms in that market”96. The model of “complete 
competition” provides “the substantive standards for competition law, requiring that law be 
used to prevent the creation of monopolistic power, abolish existing monopoly positions 
where possible, and where this was not possible, control the conduct of monopolies”97. State 
interventions in the market would aim to remove market disruptions by breaking up 
“avoidable monopolies” and regulating “unavoidable monopolies” (natural monopoles)98. 
Competition law has thus to provide a standard of conduct for dominant firms. The “as if” 
competition standard applies to all kinds of exclusionary practices and requires dominant 
firms to behave as if they are subject to competition
99. It is conceived “as an objectively 
applicable measure that in most cases would provide clear guidance” to dominant firms100. 
The concept embodied in this standard is based on the distinction between “performance 
competition” and “impediment competition”: dominant firms are able to do the former but 
not the latter. The categorisation of a specific business practice as being performance or 
impediment competition depends on the ability of an undertaking to perform them in the 
absence of market power. Several categories of conduct, such as predatory pricing, boycotts 
and loyalty rebates, are considered as inconsistent with the as if standard, “because a firm 
would not be able to engage in such practices unless it had monopolistic power”101. One 
could thus classify certain commercial practices as falling a priori within the category of 
impediment competition, and thus suspect if adopted by dominant firms, without any ad hoc 
analysis of their specific effects on the relevant market. 
 
However, this is not the only view on the meaning of the principle of free (complete) 
competition advocated by ordoliberals. Their model of neoliberalism is certainly different 
from that of the Chicago school, yet it presents many similarities with the Virginia school of 
constitutional economics, as some well-known commentators of ordoliberal thinking have 
noted
102
. Certainly, for ordo-liberal writers, the objective of competition law, as well as of all 
state regulation, is to promote the competitive process, perceived as an institution 
(Institutionsschutztheorie), and not to protect individuals or specific groups 
(Individualschutztheorie), such as consumers or the competitors of the dominant firm. Yet a 
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strand of exegesis on ordoliberalism takes a perspective which is more compatible with a 
welfare approach. According to this view, “[…] the introduction of a more economic 
approach with the explicit aim of increasing economic efficiency is not necessarily 
incompatible with the original goals of ordoliberal competition policy as long as the primary 
goal of ordoliberal competition policy is not endangered”103. Indeed, “ordoliberals never 
attached intrinsic value to economic freedom and that although the concept was important to 
them, this importance was embedded in the overall purpose of finding a humane order for 
society […]”104. Competition law and the preservation of the “freedom to compete” is an 
instrument to dethrone economic power, and thus lead to deconcentrated markets and 
economic democracy. Thus, from this perspective, the ordoliberal point of view is not 
deontological, but consequentialist, albeit at a broader level than the welfarist approach. Their 
aim is to control entrenched market power, not only for its negative economic aspects, but 
also in order to preserve political democracy.  
 
Yet, “complete competition” was not to be used as an empirical benchmark to guide 
state intervention in the economy but as an overall constitutional principle to design the rules 
that would govern the appropriate market order (as opposed to a laissez-faire market 
order)
105
. Contrary to what is frequently thought, the “as if” competition standard should only 
apply to natural monopolies. Certainly not, to all kinds of exclusionary conduct
106
. The 
principle of “freedom to compete” can at most be perceived as a principle governing interest 
balancing in cases of exclusionary conduct, rather than as an operational standard for 
adjudication
107
. For this view, the original ordo-liberal thought would not object to 
“efficiency considerations based on modern economic tools when such considerations are 
used to inform and guide the framework within which market transactions take place”108 
 
It is not the place here to examine in detail how representative of the ordoliberal 
thought each of these two views is. It is also true that ordoliberal thought contains many 
different strands and has evolved in ways that its original inceptors would not necessarily 
recognize today. One could however make the following remarks:  
 
(i). The decoupling of economic (e.g. efficiency, consumer welfare) and non-
economic or non-welfare (e.g. fairness, freedom. economic democracy) objectives, which for 
some authors explain the assumed opposition of ordoliberal thought to efficiency
109
, does not 
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hold. On the contrary, for early ordoliberals, the legal, economic and the social dimensions 
were integrated into an ethical, economic and juridical order, the competitive market order
110
. 
Certainly, the “outcome oriented flavour” of the concept of “Social Market Economy” 
requires some supplementary social policies to be implemented, and thus suggests a 
decoupling of the efficiency dimension of the market from social policy, the latter aiming to 
make the market order more ethically appealing
111
. However, this concept was introduced in 
ordoliberal thought after the Second World War, as a result of a political consensus with 
social-democrats,
112
 and does not necessarily affect the core emphasis of the ordoliberal 
thought on competitive order. 
 
 (ii). One should distinguish between the constitutional level and the sub-
constitutional level. For ordoliberals, the competitive market order is a constitutional order 
and relates to the choice of the rules of the game, the question of how market processes are 
institutionally framed, rather than perceived as a policy intervening in market processes
113
. J. 
Vanberg observes that the concept of “Leistungswettbewerb”  
 
“denotes the ideal of a market order framed by rules that aim at making producers 
responsive to consumer interests […] To establish an order of Leistungswettbewerb 
means to adopt rules for the market game that make consumer preferences the 
ultimate controlling force in the process of production”114.  
 
According to this view, the principle of consumer sovereignty offers a clear answer to the 
question of how disputes ought to be decided: “[…] adopting rules for the market game that 
promote consumer sovereignty is to the mutual advantage of citizens because, even though 
there will always be occasions in which they will be harmed in their interests as producers, 
the benefits they will realize as consumers over the course of the market game will assure 
them “general compensation”115. One should, however, distinguish this constitutional level 
question, indicating where the rules of the market game are chosen and which can integrate 
economic and welfarist considerations, from assessing the welfare consequences of 
alternative options at a sub-constitutional or adjudicative level, that of everyday decision-
making. At this level, it is clear that ordoliberals conceived the concept of consumer 
sovereignty as requiring the a priori setting of fixed rules or adequate decision procedures but 
they did not expect that these rules will be rectified by reference to the effects produced to 
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consumer welfare of each individual case examined: the rules must “define a framework 
within which economic agents can freely make their decisions, inasmuch as, precisely, every 
agent knows that the legal framework is fixed and its action and will not change”116 and thus 
cannot depend on an ad hoc analysis of predicted welfare effects for each individual case. 
Market actors should preserve their autonomy in framing their strategies a priori in 
accordance to the rules of the game.  
 
Ordoliberalism thus essentially consists in the application of the rule of law in the 
economy. Contrary to central planning or laissez faire liberalism, it does not rely on state 
intervention on the market through regulation, but on judicially enforceable rules, courts 
being transformed to “organs of national economic policy”117. This opposition to state 
interventionism and this preference for judicially enforceable rules also changes the role of 
economic analysis. There is a difference between the situation where economists assist the 
courts in deciding how existing legal rules are applied to particular cases and one where the 
courts make their decisions to permit or prohibit a business practice “contingent on how 
economists assess their welfare effects in particular cases”118. This distinction does not 
necessarily reproduce that between positive and normative economics, but obviously the two 
issues are interrelated
119
. 
 
4. The competitive process as an intrinsic normative value 
 
 Some authors value the competitive process irrespective of the consequences that this 
might have for welfare. There are different intellectual premises for such an approach. Some 
might go as far as advocating a natural right to participate to the competitive process, a right 
that others (including the State) should respect: it is only within the constraints imposed by 
other people’s right to participate to the competitive process that anyone is entitled to pursue 
his self-interest. Nozick has famously claimed that it is only if we have an eye on the process 
that we can conclude that a distribution of resources in society is just
120
. This is a process in 
which no-one’s rights, in our context the right to participate to the competitive process, have 
been violated. Whatever results are produced from such process, are presumed to be just. 
This view would provide a different perspective than the concept of distributive justice as a 
utilitarian principle (e.g. see our developments on the social welfare function). A distribution 
of resources will not be just by virtue of conforming to some structural principle(s) of just 
distribution or some pattern which would rely on natural dimension, weighted sum of natural 
dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions
121
 (e.g. maximizing utility or 
ensuring the acquisition and use of capabilities for all), but we will assume that the exercise 
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of freedom (here to compete), under of course the constraint of preserving the freedom of 
others, will produce the desirable pattern. 
 
A different, although related, approach of Hayekian inspiration, would advance that 
the concept of economic efficiency or more broadly welfare is a “mirage”122, because of the 
problem of dispersed and subjective knowledge, which seriously compromises the idea of an 
efficient decision-making in the sense of an accurate balancing of social costs and benefits
123
. 
We can only assess the actions of individuals by inquiring if they conform to prescribed rules 
of conduct or process, not in assessing their outcomes
124
. It is clear that the attraction of the 
“spontaneous order” has been particularly important for authors claiming the Austrian or the 
Ordoliberal schools of thought, although of course the two may be distinguished as forming 
two distinct intellectual traditions in the Continental post-war development of the stream of 
neoliberal thought, marked by its opposition to central planning and Keynesian economics
125
. 
 
Although the content of ordoliberal thinking has been the object of many efforts of 
exegesis, one may argue that ordo-liberal authors do not focus on specific market outcomes 
but on the protection of the competitive process from abuse of (economic) power. The 
concept of “complete competition” (vollständige Konkurrenz), which forms the foundation of 
their analysis, precisely aims to characterize a market situation where no market participant 
(firms, consumers) has the power to coerce others. Nevertheless, this concept somehow 
creates an anomaly in the ordo-liberal setting, as it might give the impression that the ordo-
liberals take an outcomes-driven perspective and thus require the intervention of competition 
law each time the market situation is not compatible with the ideal of “complete 
competition”, more or less like a neoclassical price theorist would perceive the ideal of 
“perfect competition”. The use of the concept of “performance competition” 
(Leistungswettbewerb), by some of these authors, might be a source of additional ambiguity 
as it also seems to refer to outcomes, rather than the competitive process as such. Yet, it is 
meant in a process-oriented way, as requiring the preservation of competition on the merits. 
 
Some authors have recently advanced an “Ordo-Austrian” approach to competition 
law that would rely on the “normative value of the competitive process”126. They oppose both 
utilitarian/consequentialist and deontological approaches and claim value pluralism. More 
concretely, they suggest a “methodological unbundling” of the concept of competition from 
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economic values and its constitutional status
127
. The recognition of the constitutional status of 
competition “by no means implies its hierarchical superiority to other societal values such as 
consumer welfare” and does not guarantee absolute protection128. They propose a two-steps 
methodology of balancing these conflicting values, the first one “isolating each value from all 
others in order to undertake (its) independent analysis” and understand its “internal essence”, 
the second one re-contextualising “previously isolated values into the main regulatory 
agenda”129, the regulator developing “an inductive algorithm of priorities” that would 
establish a “dialectic interplay” between these different values130.  
 
In essence, this dialectical approach attempts to avoid the usual criticism made to 
utilitarian approaches, the incommensurability of the different values in conflict and the 
tendency of the value of utility to dominate, while it claims to offer a practical way out to the 
paradox of freedom, by enabling some form of trade-off to take place at the second step of 
the inquiry. It remains, however, unclear what is the added value (other than theoretical) 
offered by the first step of the analysis and how the interplay between the two steps could 
operationalize in practice. Furthermore, one might oppose a “dialectical logic” that would put 
to work contradictory terms within the homogenous, even if some effort is made to assess 
conflicting values within the context of utility and that of competition, as it is suggested by 
the proponents of “dialectical antitrust”, for a “strategic logic” that would “not stress 
contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises their resolution in a unity” (that of 
welfare and/or that of competition), but will aim instead “to establish the possible 
connections between disparate terms that remain disparate”, thus preferring “the logic of 
connections between the heterogenous and not the logic of homogenization of the 
contradictory”131. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis of these non-economic welfare objectives has shown that 
some of them might be related and/or taken into account by the concept of welfare or well-
being, if welfare and well-being are interpreted more broadly than what is usually the case in 
neoclassical price theory.  
 
For example, the market integration objective might have various interpretations- it 
might be that we value volumes of trade even if this is not efficient (from the point of view of 
the welfare of the citizens/consumers – e.g. increased volumes of trade in drugs and other 
dangerous products affecting health) or we can take as our aim to promote “efficient trade”, 
thus adopting a holistic perspective on the internal market objective that would incorporate 
the citizen’s preferences for environmental protection, public health, the protection of 
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consumers
132
. The Treaty actually favours the efficient trade thesis as it incorporates these 
public interest objectives as an exception to the principle of free trade. So it is possible to take 
a welfarist perspective on the objective of Internal market integration as well in the context of 
EU competition law. 
 
A similar approach may also apply to a certain extent to the principle of fairness or 
distributive justice. Fairness might mean different things (equality of opportunities, a fair 
distribution of outputs or of capabilities etc)
133
 but if someone defines it as distributive 
justice, a social welfare function or a distributionally weighted cost benefit analysis could 
incorporate distributive justice concerns. To a certain extent, a broader consumer welfare 
standard (which would include not just the loss of consumer surplus but also the wealth 
transfers from consumers to producers/suppliers and which would require that countervailing 
efficiency gains compensate fully consumers for their losses) might be a way to take into 
account some of the distributive justice effects of anticompetitive practices. Also, recall the 
efforts I mentioned previously to broaden the view of well-being by adopting an extended 
objective list approach that would incorporate a number of values
134
. 
 
In conclusion, we are left with some contested and ambiguous principles, which raise 
the limitations of economic methodology to resolve all issues. This excursion to the 
normative underpinnings of theories on the goals of competition law also indicates that 
basing our analysis on external (to the legal system) and ambiguous sources of authority, 
such as economic efficiency or consumer welfare, without proper discussion of their genesis 
and evolution and an informed translation of their meaning in the legal context they are 
incorporated to
135
, might lead to bad public policy and bad law. For this reason I would be 
critical to the efforts by some authors to advance a normative argument in favour of an 
efficiency/total welfare standard or a distributive justice/consumer welfare standard, without 
a proper consideration of these factors.  
 
Instead, I would advance an evidence perspective. To explain the difference between 
the normative and the evidence approach I would stress the ability of the legal sub-system to 
select its cognitive sources (e.g. what can constitute evidence), which implies that it can also 
exclude some other sources of knowledge. The legal sub-system is certainly cognitively open, 
but not all knowledge may be taken as evidence, nor does it impact in the same way the 
decision-making process. In other words, the fact that a source external to the legal system 
might provide information on what is efficient or just, through an array of methodologies 
(e.g. revealed preferences theory), may be of little value, unless the legal system calls for this 
external expertise in the task of interpreting legal norms or delegates the task of interpreting 
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legal norms to non-legal experts (e.g. welfare economists) and disposes the tools to assess it. 
In any case, even if there is delegation, this should not lead to the risk of “hegemonic” or 
“deferential translations”136. I have argued elsewhere that the economic concepts introduced 
in legal discourse (most often through soft law instruments, such as guidelines) lose their 
nature of pure economic concepts and become by their integration also part of the legal 
conversation/legal “way of talk” – they get their meaning by the new normative context to 
which they have been integrated. Indeed, it is ludicrous to think that the standards of validity 
(internal or external) applied in academic economics would be the same than those practised 
by forensic economists in competition litigation, although there is certainly an effort made by 
the latter to be inspired by academic practices in the way their expertise is presented and 
assessed
137
. However, there are serious differences, such as administrability concerns, time 
and complexity. This does not mean that economic welfare considerations are useless, rather 
that economics should take a positive rather than a normative perspective and constitute one 
of the possible sources of evidence for the resolution of legal disputes, should the specific 
legal system decide, for a reason, to include them among its sources of wisdom.  
 
III. A positive law perspective on the objectives of EU competition law 
 
A. A view from the bench 
 
 The current state of the case law of the European Courts (General Court and the Court 
of Justice of the EU) may cast doubt on the appeal of the theory of a unitary objective 
(welfare or the protection of the competitive process) and may indicate that EU competition 
law adheres to goals pluralism. This may be contrasted to the rule-making activity of the 
European Commission, which has been moving in recent years towards an “economic 
approach” that would value, probably higher than other objectives, the goal of “consumer 
welfare” or the protection of consumers138.  
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If we focus for illustration purposes at the jurisprudence of the European Courts on 
the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU
139
, it would be difficult to find a clear trend towards 
one objective
140
. One might argue that there is a tendency for the aim of the protection of 
consumers to become the “apple of discord” between those advancing the view that the aim 
of this provision is the protection of the competitive process, the institution of competition, 
and others arguing for a “more economic approach” that would interpret Article 102 TFEU in 
conformity with neoclassical price theory and the overall objective of the protection of the 
consumers. Both groups, however, recognize the importance of the objective of market 
integration in the interpretation and application of Article 102 TFEU
141
. The first view was 
merely advanced by authors inspired by the “ordoliberal” approach. In her Opinion in British 
Airways, Advocate General Kokott provides a succinct summary of the main message of 
ordoliberalism with regard to the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU: 
 
“[Article 102] forms part of a system designed to protect competition within the 
internal market from distortions (Article 3(1)(g) EC). Accordingly, Article 82 EC, like 
the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect 
the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the 
structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an institution), which has 
already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the market. In 
this way, consumers are also indirectly protected.  Because where competition as such 
is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared”142. 
 
As it has been argued by some authors adopting this intellectual tradition, the focus on 
competition as such may be explained by the need to ensure a wide scope for the application 
of the principle of competition: 
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“(t)o concentrate on a single aim, namely that of consumer welfare, would reduce the 
scope of competition law significantly. The current law protects not only consumers 
but also producers. […] Why does the law protect producers and not only consumers? 
Producers have the same rights as anyone else in a market economy. In particular, 
they enjoy property rights. If we wish, and this seems to be the most important point, 
to encourage people to commit themselves to an activity on a market, we ought to 
protect them from expropriation. This includes protection against expropriation by 
way of cartelization or abuse of dominance. If we took the view that it is acceptable 
for a purchasing cartel to deny a manufacturer the possibility of earning revenues on a 
previous investment, we would create a disincentive to market participation”143. 
 
 Recent case law has confirmed the importance of the protection of the structure of 
competition or competition as such, in the context of Article 102 as well as for Article 101 
TFEU
144
.  
 
 Influenced by the aim to protect the competitive process and the structure of 
competition, the EU Courts have also proclaimed the “special responsibility” of the dominant 
undertakings to protect the competitive process. Based on this “special responsibility”, the 
case law has frequently found (i) an inference of consumer harm from the fact that the 
structure of the market has been affected or from the fact that competitors have been 
excluded and (ii) has developed rather strict burden of proof rules for dominant undertakings, 
shifting the burden of production of exculpatory evidence of an abuse to the dominant 
undertaking once some inference of likely anticompetitive effect is made. The Court of 
Justice first employed this concept in Michelin I, where it noted that a dominant undertaking 
“has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the common market”145. Since then, the term has been repeated a number of 
times by the Court of Justice
146
 and the Commission referred to it in its Enforcement 
Priorities Guidance
147
. 
 
The case law does not make explicit the theoretical and practical reasons that impose this 
special responsibility on dominant firms. The likelihood of anticompetitive effects does not 
seem to be the main reason for this special responsibility. If this were the case, all firms 
holding market power, not just dominant firms, would bear a special responsibility to 
preserve the competitive process. The concept of special responsibility restricts the dominant 
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firms’ commercial freedom in comparison to non-dominant undertakings. The latter remain 
free to use commercial practices that are different from those governing normal 
competition
148. The focus of the test seems to be the protection of “free competition” or 
“complete competition” and “open markets”149. The concept of special responsibility of 
dominant firms may also be explained by the emphasis of EU competition law on consumer 
sovereignty, rather than on the concept of consumer welfare as such. Consumer sovereignty 
can be preserved by the ability of consumers to influence price, quality, variety, and 
subsequently the competitive (or innovation) process according to their own preferences. This 
is directly linked to the definition of dominance in EU competition law, which appears to 
contain two conditions: the ability to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market, but also, the “power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
competitors, customers and consumers”150. The emphasis on the special responsibility of 
dominant firms to protect the competitive process should therefore be understood as a proxy 
for consumer sovereignty. 
 
In other cases, EU Courts have taken a different perspective emphasizing the aim of 
the protection of the interest of final consumers. For example in Konkurrenverket v. 
TeliaSonera Sverige AB, the Court of Justice held with regard to the objectives of Article 
102: 
“Article 102 TFEU is one of the competition rules referred to in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
which are necessary for the functioning of that internal market […] 
The function of those rules is precisely to prevent competition from being distorted to 
the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby 
ensuring the well-being of the European Union. […] 
Accordingly, Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as referring not only to practices 
which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those which are 
detrimental to them through their impact on competition”151. 
 
 An adept of the economic efficiency approach can of course find satisfaction in the 
reference to the concept of public interest (consumers and undertakings) thus indicating that 
the Court adopts a total welfare standard approach. The Court does not also refer to the 
structure of competition but to impact on competition, thus indicating that this term might be 
interpreted as the appropriate degree of competition for the achievement of the objectives of a 
total welfare standard. It is also clear that harm to consumers is a crucial element of a 
competition law case, although consumers are not the primary focus of the Court (which also 
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refers to individual undertakings, unless this concept is to be interpreted as intermediary 
consumers), thus implicitly rejecting a consumer welfare standard (widely or narrowly 
defined).  
 
Yet, although recent, the case law of the Court is not without ambiguities. In Post 
Danmark v. Konkurrecerädet, the Court held that it is in no way the purpose of Article 102 
TFEU to prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on its own merits, the dominant position on 
a market
152
. Nor does that provision seek to ensure that competitors less efficient than the 
undertaking with the dominant position should remain on the market. The Court seems not to 
grant importance to inefficient competitors because competition on the merits may, by 
definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are 
less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other 
things, price, choice, quality or innovation. This approach could be in opposition to the wider 
concept of consumer welfare (that would include transfers of wealth) as in this case the Court 
would have considered the constraint that even non efficient competitors may set to the 
pricing practices of dominant firms. Yet, it might be compatible with a narrow view of 
consumer welfare (that of consumer surplus). It is noteworthy that the protection of the 
“buyer’s freedom as regards choice of sources of supply” or the protection of competitors’ 
access to the market, were also among the elements examined by the Court in the following 
paragraphs of the case
153
. Some recent case law of the General Court has also explicitly 
referred to the importance of the objective to protect the final consumers
154
.  
 
In other recent cases the Court has emphasized other objectives. In MOTOE, the 
Court and Advocate General identified “equality of opportunity” as an aim pursued by EU 
competition law
155
. In Deutsche Telekom, the General Court asserted that a margin squeeze 
by a dominant telecoms operator was abusive because it unfairly limited access by 
downstream competitors to the market, violating Article 102(a)
156
. In British Airways and 
Michelin II, confirmed by the European Courts, the European Commission’s decisions both 
found that rebate schemes (as well as being exclusionary and discriminatory) were “unfair” to 
the affected travel agents and dealers
157
. 
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In conclusion, positive law supports the view that EU competition law pursues 
multiple goals. To this case law, one might add the drafting of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
sets the broader framework of competition law and policy in the EU and advances the idea of 
a more holistic competition law. 
 
B. A view from the Treaty: towards a holistic EU competition law 
 
1. The evolving legal framework of the Treaty for competition law 
 
Despite the relative minor modifications brought in the substantive provisions of EU 
competition law, the negotiation and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lisbon marked the first 
time in the chronicles of European integration that the role of competition law in the structure 
of the Treaties has been questioned. The debate was ignited by the attempt of the president of 
France, Nicolas Sarkozy, to abolish any reference to competition law as an objective of the 
Union, competition law being rather considered as a means to accomplish the broader tasks 
of the Union
158
. Article 3(1)g of the Treaty of European Communities recognized the vital 
importance of establishing “a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted”. Based on a contextual and teleological interpretation of this provision, the Court 
of Justice of the EU was able to extend the application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary 
conduct that harms the effective competition structure and prejudices consumers in an 
indirect way
159
. The first merger regulation in 1989
160
, as well as the new one in 2004, also 
make reference to Article 3(1)g in their first recitals
161
. The Court of Justice relied on this 
provision to apply the principle of free competition to State measures in a number of cases
162
, 
as well as to put in place EU remedies for the effective enforcement of competition law
163
. 
Furthermore, the Court has placed particular emphasis on Article 3(1)g when confronted with 
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a conflict between competition rules and other policies and objectives
164
 and has pronounced, 
on the basis of this provision, that competition law constitutes a “fundamental objective of 
the Community”165. Finally, the Court referred to this article when it granted to national 
competition authorities the power to set aside provisions of domestic legislation that 
jeopardize the “effet utile” of Article 101 TFEU166.  
 
The existence of a specific provision emphasizing the role of competition law in the 
text of the so called “principles” part of the founding treaty, led to specific implications as to 
the interpretation of this provision and its relation with other Community activities. This was 
reinforced by Article 4 TEC, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, adding a new joint 
action of the Community and the Member States in the “adoption of an economic policy, 
which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the Internal 
Market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition”. The scope of the principle of 
“free competition” was thus extended beyond the narrow confines of the competences of the 
Community (although these were already broadly defined). The Member States should be 
inspired by this principle in conducting their economic policies. In a similar vein, 
“competitiveness” was also added as an aim of the Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1997. The distinction between “aims” and “activities” did not adequately represent the role 
of competition law in the legal framework put in place by the successive European treaties. In 
reality, competition was conceived as an important intermediate objective, the aims of Article 
2 being more difficult to assess and representing long term aims. Progressively, the role of 
competition law evolved from an instrument for the completion of broader aims to an 
important objective of the Community. Indeed, as the Court of Justice recognized in 
Continental Can, the objectives pursued by Article 3(1)g were “indispensable” for the 
achievement of the Community’s tasks. 
 
This upgraded role was reflected in the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty, which listed 
competition not only as one of the guiding principles, but also as one of the “objectives” of 
the EU. According to Article I-3(2) of the Constitutional Treaty, “the Union shall offer its 
citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal 
market where competition is free and undistorted”. Competition policy was portrayed as the 
“fifth freedom” and included in the chapter on the Internal Market, thus linking competition 
to the aim of market integration and raising the rank of competition law to that of the 
fundamental freedoms of movement (free movement of goods, services, persons and capital). 
These were interpreted by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice at the time as equivalent 
to fundamental rights, at the core of the European constitutional project
167
. It is noteworthy 
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that, almost during the same period, the jurisprudence of the Court recognized that the 
principle of free movement constitutes a source of individual rights that may be granted 
against public powers
168
. For example, an individual has the right to exercise an economic 
activity by selling products or services across borders. 
 
This constitutionalisation process bestows to the provisions on free movement and 
consequently the “fifth freedom” of competition law a normative status equivalent to that of 
fundamental rights. Adopting such an approach would have significant consequences to the 
substance and central role of competition law in the architecture of EU law, because of the 
following two major changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon: Article 6-1 TEU, provides 
that the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties. Furthermore, Article 6-2 stipulates 
that the EU can accede to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). According to 
Protocol 8 and Declaration n° 2, the accession “shall make provision for preserving the 
special characteristics of the Union and Union law” or to preserve the “specific features” of 
Union law. Once the EU becomes a member of the ECHR, the ECHR will be binding upon 
the Union and will enable undertakings to challenge in front of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg decisions by EU institutions on the ground that these violate specific 
ECHR provisions
169
. This pre-supposes, of course, exhaustion of all EU remedies. The 
existing case law of the Court of Justice on fundamental rights is certainly inspired by that of 
the ECHR. Furthermore, according to the homogeneity clause included in the first instance of 
Article 52(3) of the Charter, the fundamental rights contained in the Charter which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the same meaning and scope as 
those laid down by the ECHR. This is an important evolution as there are some differences 
between the two Courts with regard to the interpretation of the protected rights, as well as 
relating to the degree of convergence to the ECHR standards of the different areas and 
sources of EU law
170
. Certainly, the fundamental rights recognized by the EU are already 
enjoying constitutional status
171
. The inclusion of the Charter in the Treaties would thus not 
bring any change to the legal value of the Charter. It might produce, however, important 
practical implications, if interpreted in conjunction with the repeal of Article 3(1)g, the 
broader horizontal integration provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the emphasis 
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on the concept of “social market economy”. One could argue that, relying on these 
provisions, the courts may develop a more holistic approach in their interpretation of the 
competition law provisions of the Treaty, in particular in order to guarantee the attainment of 
other objectives, public policies and occasionally the EU protected fundamental rights that 
might be frustrated by the application of competition law. 
 
The new Article 3 introduced by the TEU merges the old Articles 2 and 3 TEC into an 
integrated framework that includes the broad economic and non-economic objectives and 
tasks of the Union. There is no reference to the principle of “undistorted competition” or 
“free competition”. Article 3(3) TEU provides that the Union shall establish an internal 
market with the goal to achieve “a highly competitive social market economy”, aiming at full 
employment and social progress. As it was previously mentioned, the concept of “social 
market economy” replaces the expression “open market economy with free competition” in 
former Article 4(1) TEC. Competition law in the EU is thus inexorably linked to the 
objectives of the Internal Market and the establishment of a “social market economy”. It gets 
transformed from an objective (under the draft Constitutional Treaty) to a means for the 
completion of other objectives. These are much more precise than the ones mentioned in 
former Article 2 TEC and consist in the following two: the Internal Market and “Social 
Market Economy”. Furthermore, contrary to the Constitutional Treaty, competition law is not 
considered as a “fifth freedom”, nor has it been moved to the Internal Market chapter of the 
TFEU. Article 3(c) TFEU indicates that competition law is, as before, one of the EU’s 
exclusive competences confined to the establishment of competition rules “necessary for the 
functioning of the Internal Market”. The link to the Internal Market objective becomes even 
more explicit in Protocol No. 27 on “the Internal market and competition”, annexed to the 
TEU and TFEU with the aim to neutralize the repeal of former Article 3(1)g. The Protocol 
provides that “the Internal market as set out in Article 3 TEU includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted”. Interestingly, the Protocol does not include any reference to the 
concept of “social market economy” and merely reproduces the text of the old Article 3(1)g. 
  
The concept of “social market economy” rests undefined in the Lisbon Treaty, as it 
was the case for the draft constitutional treaty where it first made its appearance in the 
context of EU primary law
172
. The concept has certainly German origins
173
. One could also 
advance that it might refer to a specific variety of capitalism linked to the “coordinated 
market economies” model of Continental Europe, as opposed to the “liberal market 
economy” model174. Alternatively, it is possible to infer from this juxtaposition of the concept 
of “social market economy” with that of free competition, the opposition between the “two 
organizing principles in society”, from one side, economic liberalism with the establishment 
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and institutionalization of markets, and, from the other side, the principle of social 
protection
175
. 
 
2. Implications for the role of competition law 
 
 What are the implications of this new drafting for the role of competition law in the 
Union’s constitutional framework and, more generally, in its competition policy substance?  
 
First, the conceptualization of competition law as a means to achieve the Internal 
Market as well as the other objectives of the Treaty, offers discrete interpretive choices to 
courts. One of them consists in rejecting the theory that competition is valued “as such”, 
because of its constitutional dimension or its nature of fundamental freedom or right. Losing 
its character of being an objective and becoming simply a means to achieve other objectives 
implies that if any argument is made for the principle of free competition, this cannot be 
deontological, but surely consequentialist, as the desirability of competition is assessed with 
regard to the completion of the broader aims it endeavours to achieve. In other words, 
competition is perceived as an efficient mechanism to achieve the objectives of the EU. The 
implicit assumption is that competitive markets are the best mechanism to allocate resources 
and to achieve the aims of the Union at the lowest cost. Its role is, however, incidental to the 
completion of those objectives. Such an interpretation of the text and the new structure of the 
Treaty might give a different meaning to the recent emphasis of the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the EU on the protection of “competition as such”176. One could be 
tempted to re-interpret this formula from a consequentialist perspective, as either expressing 
the preferences “of the public at large” for the preservation of the competitive process and 
competitive markets or, arguably, the preferences of the consumers, in the long run
177
. This is 
of importance, in particular in view of the recent “more economic approach” adopted by EU 
competition law, which focuses on the effects of the restrictions of competition on 
consumers. I will discuss the potential effects of such an interpretive choice in the relation 
between competition law and the Internal Market objective. 
 
EU competition law has indeed followed, during the last twenty years, the path of 
economic analysis, either by adopting more economically-oriented block exemption 
regulations and guidelines or by using more economic and empirical evidence in the 
competition law decisions, at least at the European Commission’s level178. There exist, 
nevertheless, situations where the concept of “consumer welfare” of “consumer harm”, for 
example, comes to a collision course with the policy of market integration, as the highly 
mediatised cases on the parallel import of pharmaceuticals (the Glaxo saga) may illustrate. 
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The Court had to compare the possible benefits for consumers of restrictions to parallel trade 
with a possible encroachment to the Internal Market principle. After some initial hesitations 
generated by the case law of the General Court
179
, the Court of Justice seems to have re-
affirmed the (primary) role of the Internal Market objective
180
. The modifications introduced 
by the TEU and the TFEU seem to confirm the importance of market integration in EU 
competition law. It is also true that the protection of the competitive process, in this case 
intrabrand competition between various pharmaceutical wholesalers across the Union, may 
also enhance the objective of the Internal market, if the latter objective is conceived as an 
elimination of public and private barriers to trade. However, as the judgment of the General 
Court in this case illustrates, there is tension between the protection of the Internal Market 
and the welfare of final consumers: because of the intense price regulation of pharmaceuticals 
and the involvement of state actors, enhancing parallel trade does not necessarily lead to 
lower prices for final consumers but, on the contrary, to the enrichment of intermediaries, 
such as parallel importers, which do not participate to the research and development effort in 
the industry. Consequently, there is less innovation from which may benefit consumers in the 
long run. A pro-consumer welfare perspective would thus lead to finding that restrictions to 
parallel imports should not be prohibited, if this could encourage innovation benefiting 
consumers sufficiently in the long run so as to outweigh the short run effects to allocative 
efficiency of such prohibition.  
 
The protection of consumers figures also as an important objective of the Union, 
following the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 12 TFEU provides that “consumer protection 
requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union policies 
and activities”. This article may be interpreted as requiring that the protection of the interest 
of the consumer should be an integral part of EU competition law and policy
181
, as it should 
be for any other policy of the Union. The interpretive outcome would therefore depend on the 
balance between allocative efficiency (the price of pharmaceuticals is lower with parallel 
imports) and dynamic efficiency (there is more innovation by the pharmaceutical industry if 
parallel restrictions are restricted). Protocol no. 27 stresses that the “system” of competition 
law is part of the broader Internal Market objective. By doing so, it clarifies that market 
integration constitutes the specific aim of competition law, meaning that in case of conflict 
between this aim and other more general aims followed by the Treaty, such as the protection 
of the interest of consumers, the objective of the Internal Market should take priority. 
Certainly, the repeal of Article 3(1)g raises the issue of the rank of competition law and its 
relation to other provisions of the Treaty, in case of conflict. In terms of legal effect, pursuant 
to Article 51 TEU, Protocol no. 27 has, however, clearly the same legal status as the TEU and 
the TFEU. The Courts maintain their ability to ensure the “effet utile” of this provision, as it 
was previously the case with Article 3(1)g.  
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Secondly, the inclusion in Article 3(3) of the concept of “a highly competitive social 
market economy” might influence the Courts when deciding on the interaction of competition 
law with other policies pursued by the Treaty
182
. This situation should be distinguished from 
that relating to the existence of a specific objective of EU competition law, the Internal 
Market, following Protocol no. 27. One could analyse the inclusion of the concept of “social 
market economy” in the text of the Treaties as profoundly interlinked with the addition of 
broad horizontal integration provisions with the aim to manage the interaction between the 
different policies pursued by the Treaty, included in Title II of the TFEU entitled “Provisions 
having general application”183. The concept of “social market economy” operates more as an 
interpretive principle, rather than as an objective of EU competition law. The idea is to 
transform the Union to some form of holistic polity with competence to act, or at least to 
consider, all aspects of the welfare of its citizens. Article 9 of the TFEU states that “(i)n 
defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, 
training and protection of human health”184. As discussed above, one could also add Article 
12 on consumer protection. Such broad policy integration provisions did not exist in the 
general principles part of the previous Treaties, albeit in some specific areas, such as the 
protection of the environment
185
. The inclusion of these provisions will inevitably lead the 
Commission and arguably the Courts to grant more importance to broader public interest 
concerns in some circumstances.  
 
Would this bring any change to current practice? The Commission has a clear stance 
against aggregating effects across markets
186
 and balancing competition with other public 
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interests, to the extent that these public interest objectives cannot be taken into account in the 
competition assessment
187
.  The Commission takes into account the positive welfare effects 
of an agreement as long as “the group of consumers affected by the restriction and benefiting 
from the efficiency gains are substantially the same”188. Had the Commission taken a positive 
view towards aggregation across markets (and not only related relevant markets, such as 
downstream markets, where one can assume that the consumers affected would be 
substantially the same), this would have led to quantification problems and difficult 
distributional choices between various categories of consumers
189. The Court’s position on 
this issue seems more liberal. In a number of cases on the application of Article 101(3) the 
Court had regard to advantages arising from the agreement, not only for the specific relevant 
market but also for “every other market on which the agreement in question might have 
beneficial effects”190. Public interest objectives have occasionally outweighed the finding of a 
restriction of competition in the context of Article 101(1), when an activity is (self-)regulated 
and the restraints are ancillary for its organization and operation
191
. To this, one could add the 
interpretation of the concept of “undertaking” by the Commission and the courts with the aim 
to exclude from the scope of the competition law provisions of the Treaty certain activities, 
when applying competition law might jeopardize the public interest pursued
192
. The Court 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
efficiencies achieved on separate markets can be taken into account provided that the group of consumers 
affected by the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency gains are substantially the same”. 
187
 Ibid, para. 42: “Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they can 
be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 81(3) [now Article 101(3)]”. In some cases, the Commission 
has managed to integrate the public interest objectives to the competition assessment under Article 101(3). See, 
Commission Decision no. 2000/475/EC, CECED [1999] OJ L187/47, para. 55-57, taking into account collective 
benefits to the environment and balancing them against the restriction to competition, thus extending the 
competition assessment outside of the boundaries of the specific relevant market. For a critical analysis see, 
Townley, C. (2011) ‘The Relevant Market: an acceptable limit to competition analysis?’, European Competition 
Law Review, 10 490-499 
188
 Commission, Notice - Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) [2004] OJ C 101/7, para. 43. 
189
 See the comments by OFT, Article 101(3) – A Discussion of Narrow versus Broad Definition of Benefits 
(2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/events/Article101%283%29-discussionnote.pdf , pp. 37-
41. One could, however, oppose to this argument that the definition of a relevant market involves also 
distributional choices, in defining the category of consumers “worthy” of competition law protection. See, 
Lianos, I. (2009) ‘Judging Economists”: Economic expertise in competition litigation: a European view’, in I. 
Lianos & I. Kokkoris (eds.), The Reform of EC Competition Law - Towards an Optimal Competition law 
System, The Hague: Kluwer International, pp. 185-320, pp. 216-217. In any case, applying economic welfare 
analysis carries in itself a distributional choice in favour of the existing allocation of resources, following the 
second theorem of welfare economics. 
190
 Case T-86/95, Compagnie générale maritime and others v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2011, para. 130. It 
should be noted, however, that the Court also mentions Article 5 of Regulation 1017/68, specifying that any 
benefit or economic advantage should be assessed with regard to “the interest of the transport users”, thus 
restricting the type of consumers/users considered. See, Case T-213/00, CMA GCM & Others v. Commission 
[2003] ECR II-913, para. 227, where the Court notes that “both Article 81(3) EC [now Article 101(3)] and 
Article 5 of Regulation No 1017/68 envisage the possibility of exemption for, amongst others, agreements 
which contribute to promoting technical or economic progress, without requiring a specific link with the 
relevant market” (emphasis added). 
191
 Case C-309/99, Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1557; Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina and Majcen [2006] 
ECR I-6991. For an analysis of this issue in the context of Article 101 TFEU, see Townley, C. (2011), ‘Which 
Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?: public policy and its discontents’, European Competition Law Review 9 
441-448 
192
 For instance, solidarity between generations and the social security system: Joined Cases C-159/91 & 160/91, 
Poucet v. Assurances Générales de France [1993] ECR I-637; Joined Cases C-264/01,  C-306/01, C-354/01 and 
C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband [2004] ECR I-2493. 
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has also recognized the discretion of the Commission in balancing public interest objectives 
with the restriction to competition in a small number of cases regarding the enforcement of 
Article 101(3)
193
.  
 
The Commission has taken into account public interest considerations, such as 
employment policy
194
, cultural policy
195
, environmental policy
196
, the protection of public 
health
197
, among others in enforcing Article 101 TFEU. The drafting of the Treaty of Lisbon 
might accentuate that trend and lead to a more explicit consideration of public policy 
concerns, thus aligning the competition assessment under Article 101 TFEU with the 
European Merger Control Regulation, which allows for the consideration of public interest 
objectives
198
. It appears therefore that the Commission and the courts dispose of various 
instruments to integrate public interest concerns, in order to manage conflicts between the 
application of competition law and the completion of the wider objectives of the EU: they can 
exclude its application, finding that there is no economic activity and consequently an 
“undertaking”; they can perform some form of intuitive balancing, based on the 
proportionality test
199
; they might resort to a sort of quantitative cost benefit analysis, similar 
to the instrument of impact assessment (or Cost Benefit Analysis – CBA) employed for other 
governmental policies
200
, in case benefits brought for the public interests are quantifiable
201
. 
                                                          
193
 Case C-26/76, Metro v. Commission (Metro I) [1977] ECR 1875, para. 21: “The  powers conferred upon the 
Commission under Art. 85(3) [now Article 101(3)] show that the requirements for the maintenance of workable 
competition may be reconciled with the safeguarding of objectives of different nature and to this end certain 
restrictions of competition are permissible, provided they are essential to the attainment of those objectives and 
they do not result in the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the common market”; Joined cases 
T-538/93, 542/93, 543/93 and 546/93, Métropole Télévision v. Commission [1996] ECR II-649, para. 118: “in 
the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on considerations connected with 
the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty”. 
194
 Commission Decision no. 93/49/EEC, Ford/Volkswagen [1992] OJ L 20/14, para. 23 (considering the 
employment implications in the context of Article 101(3), although with additional efficiency gains); 
Commission Decision no. 94/296/EC, Stichting Baksteen [1994] L 131/15, para. 27. 
195
 Commission Decision no. 82/123/EEC, VBBB/VBVB [1982] OJ L 54/36, para. 49-63 (the resale price 
maintenance agreement was not accepted). 
196
 Commission Decision no. 94/986/EC, Philips/Osram [ 1994] OJ L 378/37, para. 27 “The use of cleaner 
facilities will result in less air pollution, and consequently in direct and indirect benefits for consumers from 
reduced negative externalities”; Commission Decision no. 2000/475/EC, CECED [1999] OJ L187/47, para. 55-
57; Commission Decision 2001/837/EC, DSD [2001] L 319/1, para. 148: “consumers will likewise benefit as a 
result of the improvement in environmental quality sought, essentially the reduction in the volume of 
packaging”. 
197
 Commission Decision 94/770/EC, Pasteur-Mérieux/Merck [1994] OJ L 309/1, para. 89 & 108 (noting that 
the technical progress and improvements in distribution achieved by the anticompetitive agreement responded 
on top to “a genuine public health concern”). 
198
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L 
24/1, recital 23 (requiring the Commission to place its appraisal within the general framework of the 
fundamental objectives of the Treaties), thus allowing broader public interest concerns to be taken inton account 
in the appraisal process); See also, Case T-12/93, Comité Central d'Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel v. 
Commission [1995] ECR II-1247, paras. 38-40 (taking into account the collective interest of employees – social 
protection). 
199
 See, for instance, Case C-309/99, Wouters, above, with regard to Article 101(1) TFEU. 
200
 OFT, Article 101(3) – A Discussion of Narrow versus Broad Definition of Benefits (2010), above, pp. 21-22 
(noting that “aligning the competition assessment under Article 101(3) with the standard cost-benefit analysis 
used in government policy would reduce the likelihood of competition analysis being out of step with wider 
government analysis or being seen as a block to desirable government policy”). One might, however, object to 
this extension of the cost benefit analysis approach in competition law by alleging the need to distinguish 
   46 
 
  
Based on the horizontal integration clauses of the Treaty, perceived as indicating the 
preferences of EU citizens, the competition law decision-makers may also devise a social 
welfare function that takes into account additional dimensions of welfare, than price and 
quality
202
.  
 
3. Obstacles to a holistic EU competition law 
 
Moving to a holistic approach that would rely on a social welfare function faces, 
nevertheless, two important obstacles. First, contrary to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the 
horizontal integration clauses do not produce any direct effect
203
. Their formulation is vague 
and inconclusive as to the legal effects produces to Member States and undertakings. The 
clauses seem to address themselves to the EU Institutions. Nevertheless, it is possible, as with 
the EU Directives, that integration clauses may produce indirect effects, including the duty of 
conform interpretation for the authorities in charge of their enforcement
204
. Facing a choice 
between two possible interpretations of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, the Commission and the 
courts should make efforts to select the option that maximizes the policy aim stated in the 
integration clause, while preserving the competitive process
205
. This form of legal pluralism 
enables the EU Institutions to connect the different spheres of their action and to ensure 
policy coherence between them. Second, a further difficulty for adopting a social welfare 
function model is the increasing involvement of national courts in the interpretation and 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The decentralization of the decision-making 
process and the inevitable focus of national courts on local costs and benefits, as opposed to 
inter-Member State effects, makes any effort to broaden the competition assessment under 
Articles 101 and 102 profoundly problematic. One could also add the complexity of 
performing the sophisticated quantitative analysis required by CBA for non-specialized 
courts. The Commission and National Competition Authorities (NCAs) are better equipped 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
between the decision to subject to cost benefit analysis state action restricting competition and that of subjecting 
to cost benefit analysis private action, claiming that applying the same approach would jeopardise the principle 
of individual autonomy and the right of every economic agent to choose its trading partners and to dispose 
freely of its property. Yet, these rights are curtailed in presence of a restriction of competition, but only to the 
extent required for addressing this specific restriction of competition. 
201
 The CECED case constitutes an illustration of this approach: Commission Decision no. 2000/475/EC, above. 
202
 See, our developments above. 
203
 See, for instance, concerning Article 6 TEC (now Article 11 TFEU), the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs 
in Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, para. 231:“Article 6 is not merely programmatic; it 
imposes legal obligations” and the Opinion of Advocate General Gelhoed in Case C-161/04 Austria v 
Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-7183, para. 59-60, noting that Article 6 TEC “cannot be regarded as 
laying down a standard according to which in defining Community policies environmental protection must 
always be taken to be the prevalent interest”, but “(a)t most (this provision) is to be regarded as an obligation on 
the part of the Community institutions to take due account of ecological interests in policy areas outside that of 
environmental protection stricto sensu” Compare with the position of AG Cosmas in Case C-321/95 
Greenpeace [1998] ECR I-1651 suggesting that the integration principle should have some form of direct effect. 
204
 Case C-106/89, Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135. 
205
 For the proposition that the environmental integration clauses result in the priority of environmental 
protection when balanced against other Treaty objectives, see Schumacher, T (2001) ‘The environmental 
integration clause in Article 6 of the EU Treaty: prioritising environmental protection’, Environmental Law 
Review 3 29-43. On the interaction of competition law with environmental protection in general, see the 
excellent study of Kingston, S. (2012) Greening EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press. 
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for this task, although one could object that they lack the adequate resources to perform this 
holistic analysis systematically. 
 
The increasing role of public interests in the enforcement of EU competition law is 
also recognized in the context of Article 106 TFEU. One could refer to Protocol no. 26 on 
Services of General Interest, which has been annexed to the Treaty with the aim to emphasize 
the importance of services of general interest. Already Article 14 TFEU (former Article 16 
TEC) recognized the role of services of general economic interest (SGEI) in the “shared 
values of the Union” and provided that Member States “shall take care that such services 
operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic and financial 
conditions, which enable them to fulfill their missions”. Nevertheless, Protocol no. 26 
includes some important interpretive provisions, such as the need to take into account the 
diversity between various services of general economic interest because of the “differences in 
the needs and preferences of users that may result from different geographical, social or 
cultural situations, which also implies that national, regional and local authorities have a wide 
discretion in providing, commissioning and organizing SGEI closer to the needs of their 
citizens, as well as the need to ensure “a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal 
treatment and the promotion of universal access and of user rights”. The Protocol affirms that 
“the provisions of the Treaties do not affect in any way the competence of Member States to 
provide, commission and organize non-economic services of general interest”206. To a large 
extent these provisions reaffirm the principles that have been progressively developed by the 
jurisprudence of the Court and the decisional practice of the European Commission
207
. 
Furthermore, Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental rights, having a similar legal value 
than the Treaties, states that “the Union recognises and respects access to services of general 
economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices”, “in order to promote the 
social and territorial cohesion of the Union”. Would the reinforced legal effect of the Charter 
in conjunction to the interpretive principle of “social market economy” provide more 
discretion to Member States with regard to the organisation of public service obligations? 
Would the scope of Article 106(1) be shrunk or that of Article 106(2) be extended as a 
consequence of these Treaty modifications? One cannot exclude these potential outcomes, 
should the Court be receptive to this interpretive option. 
                                                          
206
 It should thus be possible for a Member State to exclude certain services not presenting any economic, 
commercial and industrial character from the scope of competition law, with the exception of course of cases 
where the activity is pursued in a competitive environment, which implies that it possesses economic 
(commercial) characteristics. See, Joined Cases C-223/99 & 260/99, Agorà Srl and Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti 
Bruna & C. v Ente Autonomo Fiera  Internazionale di Milano [2001] ECR I-3605. 
207
 For example, in order to ensure the adequate operation of services of general economic interest with regard to 
quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment and the promotion of universal access, the financing of services of 
general economic interest is permitted, under certain circumstances, under the state aids regime of Article 107 
TFEU. The issue is not addressed under Article 106 TFEU. One should, however, remark that even in this case, 
there is a need for a competitive benchmark, linked to the adoption of a specific procedure for the selection of 
the operators to receive compensation based on a public tender (public procurement). For a recent commentary 
on the relation between services of general interest and competition, see Gyselen, L. (2010) ‘Services of general 
economic interest and competition under European law: a delicate balance’, Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 1(6) 491-499; Buendia Sierra, J.-L. (2007) ‘Article 86-Exclusive Rights and other Anti-
Competitive State Measures’, in Faull & Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 593-657; Bovis, C (2005) ‘Financing services of general interest in the EU: How do Public Procurement and 
State aids interact to demarcate between market forces and protection’, European Law Journal 11(1) 79-109. 
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4. Collective labour agreements and the social dimension of EU competition law  
 
 In order to illustrate how the interpretation of the competition law provisions of the 
Treaty might be affected by a greater recognition of the social dimension of the EU, I will 
focus on the example of collective labour agreements.  
 
The Court of Justice discussed the interaction between competition law and collective 
labour agreements ensuring social protection in Albany, where it excluded an agreement 
between employers and employees to make affiliation to a sectoral pension fund compulsory 
from the scope of article 101(1)
208
. The case concerned organisations representing employers 
and employees that had collectively agreed to set up a single pension fund responsible for 
managing a supplementary pension scheme and had made requests to the public authorities to 
make affiliation to the fund compulsory. The Court of Justice referred to article 2 TEC as 
well as to the social policy provisions of the Treaty in order to proclaim that the Commission 
has to promote a close cooperation between Member States in the social field and to enhance 
the dialogue between management and labour at the European level
209
. Although the Court 
recognized that “it is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in 
collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers”, it also 
held that “the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously 
undermined if management and labour were subject to Article [101(1)] of the Treaty when 
seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve the conditions of work and employment”210. It 
followed “from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole” that agreements 
concluded in the context of collective negotiations between management and labour in 
pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling 
outside the scope of Article 101(1)
211
. The value of competition had in this case to be 
sacrificed for the attainment of another value, social protection.  
 
                                                          
208
 Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-
5751. See also, Joined Cases C-115-117/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025. Interestingly, the case law does not 
exclude from the application of competition law collective agreements concluded between the members of 
liberal professions with regard to the fixation of minimum rates or other anticompetitive agreements, for 
example. See, Joined Cases C-180-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
Specialisten [2000] ECR I-6451; Commission Decision 2005/8/CE, Belgian Architects Association [2005] OJ L 
4/10. 
209
 Case C-67/96, op. cit., paras. 54-58. 
210
 Ibid., para 59. 
211
 Ibid., para 60. Without necessarily referring to the aims of the Treaty, the Court of Justice has also excluded 
from the application of Article 101 TFEU, individual agreements between an employer and an employee, 
presumably for the lack of “independence” and “autonomy” of the employee. See, Case C-22/98, Criminal 
proceedings against Jean Claude Becu [1999] ECR I-5665, notwithstanding the fact that employees offer their 
services in a particular market and could potentially be considered as undertakings. One of the possible reasons 
justifying this approach is the specificity of the labor market, which requires some form of protection for the 
employees, considered as the weakest party in the transaction. Compare with the approach of the Court in Case 
C-179/90, Merci convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA [1991] ECR I-5889, where 
Article 101 TFEU was found applicable, for the simple reason that the dock workers did not conclude individual 
contracts for the provision of their services but acted through the intermediary of dock work companies, thus 
mitigating the weakness of dock workers in individual transitions. 
   49 
 
  
It is nonetheless possible to advance a more competition-friendly reading of this case. 
As Advocate General Jacobs noted in his Opinion in Albany “this conclusion in favour of a 
limited antitrust immunity for collective agreements between management and labour is not 
incompatible with the idea that there is no exception for the social field as a whole”212. The 
main difference is that in the case of collective bargaining, the exception is not based on the 
subject-matter of the agreement but mainly on the framework in which it is concluded. These 
agreements contribute to a measure of equilibrium between the bargaining power on both 
sides, which helps to ensure a balanced outcome for both sides and for society as a whole. 
The countervailing bargaining power function of these agreements comes from the fact that 
the interests of employers and employees do not coincide: the obvious conflicting interests of 
the different parties further the public interest
213
. The Court did not exclude the application of 
competition law because the value of social protection was considered superior but it simply 
adopted a decision procedure based on a serial or lexical order
214
. Social protection was 
considered by the Court as a first principle in the order of preferences that should not lead to 
the elimination of competition (perceived as efficiency). Because of the conflicting interests 
of the employers and employees and their self-restraining effect, the agreements were 
socially valuable (and thus efficient) in this case
215
. 
 
In Viking
216
 and Laval
217
 the Court followed a different approach for the 
reconciliation of the fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market with “social” fundamental 
rights, relying on the balancing metaphor. The Court explicitly embraced the “balancing” 
terminology (although one could have some doubts on its effective application in this case) 
by noting that 
 
“(s)ince the Community has thus not only an economic but also social purpose, the 
rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social 
policy”218. 
 
                                                          
212
 Opinion of AG Jacobs, Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, op. cit., para. 183. 
213
 Ibid., para. 185. 
214
 Rawls, J. (1999, first published 1979) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, p. 38 defines 
lexicographical or serial/lexical order as following: “(t)his is an order which requires us to satisfy the first 
principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the second before we can consider the third, and 
so on. A principle does not come into play until those previous to it are either fully met or do not apply. A serial 
ordering avoids, then, having to balance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, 
so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception. We can regard such a ranking as analogous 
to a sequence of constrained maximum principles. For we can suppose that any principle in the order is to be 
maximized subject to the condition that the preceding principles are fully satisfied”. 
215
 See, for an equivalent reading, the recent opinion of AG Trstenjak, Case C-271/08, Commission v. Federal 
Republic of Germany [2010] ECR I-7091, para. 58-60. The AG noted that the “Albany exception” to the 
application of EU competition law should be interpreted restrictively. 
216
 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation & Finish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP 
and OŰ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. 
217
 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefőrbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. See also 
Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989. 
218
 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation & Finish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP 
and OŰ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, para 79 (hereinafter Viking). 
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The Court subjected collective action to the scope of the free establishment provisions 
by rejecting the view that the Community has no (positive integration) competence to 
regulate social rights and that, therefore, the negative integration provisions of the Treaty 
would not apply. It also rejected the view that collective action, perceived as a fundamental 
right, should exclude the application of a freedom of movement. The Court rightly insisted on 
the social function and the non-absolute character of this right, consistent with its previous 
case law on individual rights (not just collective), such as the right to property
219
. But the 
Court also considered that freedom of establishment is a “fundamental freedom” that needs to 
be reconciled with the fundamental right of collective action
220
, through the application of the 
proportionality principle. The Court subjected only the fundamental right to the principle of 
proportionality (not the freedom of movement/establishment), thus implying that the freedom 
of movement would be of a higher order than fundamental rights in the hierarchy of norms
221
. 
The rhetoric of the Court put aside, the test applied had nothing to do with a proper balancing 
exercise that would evaluate both costs and benefits for each value in conflict. The most 
recent case law of the Court on the reconciliation of fundamental rights with the economic 
freedoms of the Treaty maintains this one-way reconciliation: fundamental rights are only 
subject to the proportionality principle, not fundamental freedoms
222
. 
 
The reasons are not entirely clear, but it seems that in Albany the Court attached 
importance to the fact that the restriction of competition was inherent in the collective 
agreements, and thus the enforcement of competition law would have jeopardised their 
enactment, while this was not a risk to be incurred in Viking for the exercise of trade union 
rights. It was possible to exercise trade union rights without “prejudicing to a certain degree” 
the “fundamental” freedoms of movement223. However, it is impossible to conclude 
collective agreements without producing effects on wages, output, prices etc. and thus affect 
competition and consumers. The balancing metaphor could also be employed for the 
reconciliation of competition law with individual, as opposed to collective, fundamental 
rights. The integration of the Charter on Fundamental Rights into the framework of the 
Treaties may have important implications on the interpretation and enforcement of 
substantive competition law provisions. Undertakings may profit from substantive law rights, 
such as the freedom to conduct a business (Art. 16), the right to property (Art. 17) or to the 
protection of their intellectual property (Art. 17.2). 
 
It remains to be seen what option the EU Courts will follow in the reconciliation of 
fundamental rights and public policies with the substance of competition law provisions of 
the Treaty. 
 
                                                          
219
 Property is not an absolute right. European Union law emphasises the ‘social function’ of property, according 
to which, property rights can be restricted for reasons of public interest. See Case 265/87, Herman Schräder HS 
Kraftfutter GmbH v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, para 15. 
220
 For a similar approach see also opinion of AG Trstenjak, Case C-271/08, Commission v. Federal Republic of 
Germany [2010] ECR I-7091, para. 187 (noting that the content of the fundamental freedoms of movement 
might be conceived as tantamount to fundamental rights protecting economic activity). 
221
 See also, opinion of Advocate General (AG) Trstenjak, Case C-271/08, Commission v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, op. cit., para. 183. 
222
 Case C-271/08, op. cit. para. 43-49. 
223
 Case C-438/05, Viking, op. cit., para 52. 
   51 
 
  
IV. Moving beyond the goals debate: the need for a comparative institutional analysis 
 
 The important, at least in terms of numbers, literature on the goals of EU competition 
law may indicate that this issue is a paramount concern for the enforcement of EU 
competition law. Yet, this approach might commit what I will call the jurisprudential fallacy, 
that is the divorce between the question of the goal(s) presumably pursued by the legal sub-
system created by the EU Treaties for the protection of competition and that of the 
institutional organization and capacity of the adjudicative process, that is the set of rules, 
practices, competences, powers of the institutions put in place to implement this area of law 
and their interaction with those of other institutions with which they might overlap, the 
concept of competition policy being much broader than competition law. In other words, the 
approach followed by the literature on the goals of competition law disconnects the 
jurisprudential stage, if we employ the Dworkinian terminology, here the “demand side” for 
always more overreaching and sophisticated protection of the principle of competition or of 
the normative values it aims to satisfy, from the consideration of the “supply side”, “the little 
engine of law and rights”224, that is, the adjudicative process and the available technologies 
and tools for the implementation of the law. One might not be able to rely on “Herculean” 
judges or adjudicators to perform this task, even if, following Dworkin’s admonition, the 
latter focus on principles and rights, rather than on issues of policy
225
: what would be total or 
consumer welfare considerations in competition law. The view that the EU political process 
is defective might lead in this case to argue for an expansive definition of principles and 
rights, so as to enable the Herculean judge to step in. Yet, as it is rightly pointed out by Neil 
Komesar, such an approach might commit the sin of single institutional analysis, as it will 
emphasize the defects of one institutional alternative (e.g. the political process) on some 
aspects to argue for an expansive role of another, probably equally defective in some other 
aspects, institutional choice: the adjudicative process
226
. 
 
 Similar criticisms can be made to competition law scholarship on the goals of 
competition law. Some authors advance the view that these goals should be limited to 
economic efficiency or consumer welfare, arguing that the adjudicative process would be 
unable to deal with a variety of conflicting objectives
227
. Others argue that the efficiency or 
welfare view is itself complex and demanding and that a rights and rules-based rather than 
policy and standards-based competition law is more hospitable to the weaknesses of the 
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 Komesar K. N. (2001) Law’s Limits, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
225
 For the classic statement of this view see, Dworkin, R. (1975) ‘Hard Cases’ Harvard Law Review 88 1057-
1109 ; Dworkin, R. (1985), A Matter of Principle, Oxford University Press. 
226
 Komesar K. N. (2001) Law’s Limits, p. 169, noting that “(n)owhere does Dworkin consider the systemic 
characteristics of the adjudicative process to which he assigns so much responsibility [...] Judges are embedded 
in an adjudicative process that relies on the dynamics of litigation to bring judges societal issues and on the 
adversarial process to inform them. This adjudicative process is contrained by its severely limited physical 
capacity as well as by the competence of its judges and juries [...] Dworkin’s version of the Rule of Law will 
remain empty until he addresses these institutional choices and the profound systemic issues that underlie 
them”. 
227
 The classic argument was made in the context of US antitrust law by Easterbrook, F. (1985), ‘The Limits of 
Antitrust’ Texas Law Review 63(1) 1-40. In Europe, the argument has been made by many, but insistently by 
Odudu, O. (2006), The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81, Oxford University Press; 
Odudu, O. (2010) ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(3) 599-613. 
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adjudicative process
228
. Others advance a broad welfare approach that would integrate public 
policy concerns in EU competition law through a “common denominator” or cost benefit 
analysis, arguing that this is required by the intended relationship between Treaty 
provisions
229
. None of these approaches, however, examines systematically the advantages 
and disadvantages of the underlying comparative institutional choice that each decision 
involves.  
 
 I will first examine the problem of the interpretive method faced by the EU courts in 
the presence of goal pluralism and will then argue for a comparative institutional analysis. 
 
A. The goals of competition law and the problem of the interpretive method 
 
 The studies examining the goals of competition law usually adopt the following 
theoretical standpoints: Some would start from a default end-state position, determined by the 
goal(s) of competition law, and under the assumption that the legal system should or is 
effectively pursuing this aim, they would advance a specific interpretive technique or tool 
that would enable the adjudicator to attain this pre-determined desirable end-state. In other 
words, this approach requires the competition law adjudicator to discover the most effective 
form of legal reasoning, with regard to the completion of the desirable end state, before 
implementing the competition law provisions. The choice of the interpretive strategy is thus 
of little value other than the realization of the end-state sought, once the goal(s) have been 
determined. From this perspective, providing the adjudicator the widest margin of discretion 
is the prevailing strategy, as in any case, the adjudicator should guide the legal process to the 
“optimal” solution. It is not a surprise that authors advancing the goal of consumer welfare or 
that of the protection of the consumer and those arguing for a total welfare approach and 
economic efficiency agree on the rule of reason and different forms of balancing as their 
preferred strategy for implementing competition law. Their conception of legal presumptions 
remains also influenced by this balancing metaphor, as per se rules in US antitrust law or 
object restrictions in EU Competition law are perceived as embodying the balancing 
experience of the adjudicator in past decisions, or past economic analysis, culminating to the 
formation of legal presumptions that codify past practice or economic consensus
230
.  
 
The question of the ultimate goals of competition law, or put differently, the end-state 
it aims to achieve, becomes in this case the most important question that needs to be resolved 
prior to the choice of the form of balancing, as it will determine its result. The debates over 
total or consumer welfare standard can be explained through this angle. It is unclear how 
these different standards achieve different solutions in practice
231
, but discussions are often 
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characterized by theological fervour as debates over stepping stones (or is it in reality a 
stumbling block?) usually do. Some of these debates are driven by ideological commitments 
to government or inversely market failures
232
, in other instances, by “pragmatic” 
considerations over the need for global convergence, although no effort is made to explain on 
which normative grounds convergence is a desirable objective and who will ultimately 
benefit from it
233
. 
 
 The teleological and contextual methods often employed by the European Courts have 
enabled this goal-oriented approach of legal interpretation to thrive. This specific blending of 
the teleological and contextual approaches links the effort of interpretation to the purpose and 
object of the text and its systemic context (with the other provisions of the Treaty). It is 
particularly appropriate in the absence of clear definitions of the terms used by the Treaties, 
such as the concept of “competition”, and the largely imprecise language often used, the 
Treaty setting out a grand design rather than a detailed blueprint. Although the Court of 
Justice has employed a variety of interpretive methods, the teleological and contextual 
methods of interpretation have played an important role in the development of EU law in 
general and competition law in particular. The Court has famously made use of this 
“European pattern234” of interpretive method in the Continental Can case, where it explicitly 
rejected the literal interpretation of the Treaties and the reference to the experience of 
national laws (some would see in this the premises of a comparative law method), and made 
reference to the “spirit, general scheme and wording of Article [102], as well as to the system 
and objectives of the Treaty” to hold that Article 102 could apply to a merger between 
undertakings
235
.  As we have discussed earlier the use of this interpretive method has led to a 
number of important judgments of the Court expanding the reach of EU competition law.  
 
 Relying on this specific method of interpretation and the need for coherence among 
the different provisions of the EU Treaties, some authors have suggested some textual 
amendments to the Treaties in order to incorporate language that would enable the EU courts 
to “maximize” or achieve their preferred goal. Most often, these suggestions have touched 
Article 101(3), precisely because it is the one of the main two provisions of EU competition 
law that incorporates explicitly a balancing test, the fetish of all goal inspired authors. On one 
side of the spectrum, Giorgio Monti has argued for the addition of an Article 101(4) TFEU 
that would enable public policy considerations to be integrated in the balancing pot
236
. Taking 
a different perspective, Oles Andriuchyk has suggested the addition of an Article 101(4) 
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TFEU that would enable the principle of competition to take precedence in certain cases over 
public policy or welfare concerns
237
. Others have preferred the resolution of these conflicts in 
the context of both Articles 101(1) and 101(3) believing that Article 101(1) may enable the 
resolution of eventual conflicts, either by excluding the application of EU competition law, 
for example by narrowing down the concept of undertaking
238
, or by applying the principle of 
proportionality
239
. Some would see the proportionality test as a form of balancing analysis, 
this time intuitive, rather than quantitative, as it is the case for cost benefit analysis
240
, hence 
denying the distinctiveness of a “European rule of reason” or a “rule of regulatory 
ancillarity”241.  Finally, there are authors that conscious of the power of the contextual-
teleological method, exclude these public policy or non-competition concerns altogether from 
any consideration under Article 101(3), bounding Prometheus, aka the Court of Justice, on 
the basis of administrability or justiciability concerns
242
. Et j’en passe…. 
 
 Furthermore, some authors have challenged the existing case law of the EU Courts on 
Article 102 TFEU by arguing for an original intent style of interpretive method of the 
provisions of the Treaty that would require the analysis of the travaux preparatoires
243
. I 
think their suggestion misunderstands the specificities of the interpretive methods usually 
employed by the EU Courts, the claim for an autonomous hermeneutic framework, distinct 
from that of international law
244
, and the little attraction the historical method of 
interpretation has exercised so far in EU law. No serious normative argument is provided to 
justify this interpretative shift. 
 
 A different approach would not focus on goals but will examine institutions before 
exploring the question of the objectives of EU competition law. Neil Komesar has advanced a 
theory of comparative institutional analysis emphasizing the primary role of institutional 
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choice and the connections between issues of institutional choice and goals
245
. For Komesar, 
the question of the goals should follow and not precede that of institutional choice: 
“identifying a goal [...] tells us virtually nothing about law and rights”246. By institutional 
choice I mean the selection of the social decision-making process that would dispose the 
residual right of decision-making in a specific context. Komesar distinguishes between 
legislatures (the political realm), courts (adjudicators) and markets. It is, however, possible to 
break his categories and apply his analysis to various other intermediary social decision-
making processes, such as the State bureaucracy, independent regulators, private standard 
setting/self-regulation bodies, or, in our case, competition authorities. Goals are achieved by 
the intermediary of institutional processes, and institutional processes inevitably affect 
outcomes.  
 
The first implication of this standpoint is that the choice of the adequate institutional 
process, for example courts or the market, cannot be done in abstracto and from a static 
perspective, but should take an empirical and dynamic approach that would focus on the 
number and the complexity of the matters to be decided by these processes. His analysis 
suggests a shift in the choice of the adequate institutional process as numbers and complexity 
increase
247. Hence, institutional choices “define the terms of legal analysis not the other way 
around”248. As it is explained by Komesar, 
 
“[…] (V)irtually nothing follows from the choice of a goal. You cannot hardwire 
goals and institutions and, therefore, no program of law and public policy follows 
from goal choice. The simple correlations between goals and institutions that 
characterize so many ideological positions simply do not hold”249. 
 
Such an approach would abandon the “simplistic associations of goals and 
institutions”250 and would argue that institutional choice should become the focus of the 
analysis. These institutional choices can be viewed in “welfare terms (regarding the 
efficiency and distributive consequences of a particular institution) and in participatory terms 
(regarding the quality and extent of participation in the decision-making processes at 
issue)”251, the assumption being that “institutional processes mediate the articulation of 
individual preferences”252.  
 
The second implication is that the choice of the institution that will balance the costs 
and benefits should be comparative, rather than single. Institutions are alternative 
mechanisms by which societies carry out their goals. Each of them presents specific limits 
and imperfections and the decision over the most optimal one should result from a 
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comparative cost benefit analysis of all the alternative institutional choices in order to select 
the least imperfect one. Contrary to single institutional analysis that would immediately 
conclude that, for example, in presence of market failures the courts or the legislative process 
should intervene, or that in the presence of a government failure, the market is the adequate 
institutional choice, comparative institutional analysis will assess both options before any 
decision is made. According to Komesar, “we must confront the reality that the best choices 
will be highly imperfect and that the relative merits of institutions will vary across different 
settings”253. 
 
None of these institutional choices is perfect from the perspectives of social welfare 
maximization, distributive fairness or the direct and indirect participation in decision-making 
of the affected stakeholders. Under each alternative, stakeholder positions will be reflected 
and affected in different ways. Different interpretive choices can thus be analyzed using a 
comparative institutional analytic method that focuses on the relative implications of 
interpretive choices for welfare and participation. The allocation of institutional 
responsibilities always turns upon a judgment about which of the candidate institutions is, 
when compared to the other candidates, best suited to the job. Komesar is rightly criticizing 
the fallacy of single-institutionalism (that is the allocation of a social task to one institution 
based solely on the judgment that other institutions will carry out the task imperfectly, 
without the necessary comparative judgments). It is not sufficient to raise the imperfections 
of one institution, e.g. the market, advancing the view that these should be corrected by the 
political or the adjudicative process, and inversely, without comparing the relative trade-offs 
of these alternative institutional processes as well in the same context. This is of course a 
skeleton of an approach rather than a detailed and solid framework, but this route is 
promising and needs to be explored further. 
 
A further point that Komesar makes is that the quality and extent of participation can 
serve as a proxy for both efficiency and distributive consequences. All institutional processes, 
the market, the political or the adjudicative process, are marked by biases in participation, 
hence the need to conduct a comparative institutional analysis to find the least biased one. 
Komesar advances a “participation-centered” approach254, which will not commit the fallacy 
of one-sided interest  group  analysis  to  only focus  on  the  risk  of  over  representation  of  
minority  interests seeking rents, but it will search for all affected groups in various 
dimensions and will  examine how the distribution of benefits and costs of action would 
affect the ability of  different  groups  to  get  what  they  want  via  the  different  institutions.  
From this perspective, the over-representation of some majority interests (e.g. consumers) 
might also lead to unsatisfactory results from the point of view of welfare.  According  to  
this  theory,  it  is  important  to  focus  on  the  factors  determining  a  group’s  marginal  
cost  of  participation.  In  Komesar‟s  “participation- centered”  model,  “information  costs”  
and  “organization  costs”  determine  a  group’s  participation  costs255 The  first  refer  to  
the  costs  of  learning  the  law  and  procedures  applicable  as  well  as  the  costs  for  the  
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specific  institution  to  gather  information. The organization costs facing a group are the 
costs to be incurred by the members who  want  to  take  action,  and  want  other  members  
to  contribute.  Organization costs increase with group size. The size of each member’s 
individual stake - how much she stands  to  gain  from  winning - also  affects  her  inclination  
to  organize  her  fellow  members.  It follows that organization costs rise as  individual  
stakes  decrease.   
 
The  dispute  resolution  can  thus  be  biased  in  two  ways:  a  “minority  bias”  
when  a  small group with high individual stakes convinces an institution to enact its 
preferred policy and  by  doing  so  inflicts  a  greater  cost  on  a  large  group  with  lower  
individual  stakes than  the benefit  it  obtains
256
 ,  or  a  “majoritarian  bias”  when  a  large  
group  with  low individual  stakes  prevails  and  thereby  inflicts  a  greater  cost  on  a  
small,  high-stakes group  than  the  benefit  it  obtains
257
 Once  a  dispute  has  been  
identified,  the  goal  of comparative institutional analysis would thus be to find the institution 
least likely to develop a minority or majoritarian bias, that is, the institution where the group 
with the highest total stake is most likely to win. 
 
How may this framework affect the interpretive strategies followed by the competition 
authorities and the courts?  
 
B. Foundations for a comparative institutional analysis in EU Competition Law 
 
Komesar focuses on a specific topos of the adjudicative process: the courts. The 
adjudicative process constitutes a distinct form of social ordering; its distinguishing 
characteristic "lies in the “fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of 
participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision 
in his favor”258. It is usually distinguished from the political realm (in which the affected 
parties participate through voting) and the market (in which participation takes the form of 
transactions, negotiation and contract)
259
.  
 
Judges are situated decision-makers responding to disputes in light of particular social, 
political, and historical contexts that shape their views of the facts of a particular case. Courts 
may find it difficult to collect the great amount of data needed to conduct an extensive 
comparative institutional analysis. Hence, it is important to emphasize the issue of 
interpretive choice, as the judge applies standard decision-making strategies of choice under a 
situation of “irreducible empirical uncertainty”260. Taking a different perspective than 
Komesar, Adrian Vermeule observes that “interpretive choice is a choice among possible 
means to attain stipulated ends”261. According to Vermeule, “courts’ foremost concern should 
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be to minimize the costs of judicial decision-making and of legal uncertainty”262. This 
concern “pushes interpretive doctrine in the direction of formalism towards rules rather than 
standards, towards a relatively small, traceable and cheap set of interpretive sources rather 
than a relative large, complex and expansive set”263. Now there are various ways to make 
decisions under uncertainty. Some examples are delegating the decision to (a community of) 
experts in the hope that the experts can better access the empirical questions, or basing the 
decision on some group consensus in the hope that aggregating many people’s assessments of 
the uncertainties will improve accuracy, or adopt avoidance strategies, such as “allocating the 
burden of overcoming uncertainty to one position or another (commonly by placing a burden 
of proof upon opponents of status quo), or reducing the scope of uncertainty by basing 
choices upon the known costs and benefits of the candidate doctrines, while assuming that the 
unknown costs and benefits of the candidates will prove roughly equal, and picking doctrines 
swiftly, rather than choosing them after protracted deliberation”264. It is important to 
acknowledge here that “judges have far superior information about the costs of decision-
making and legal uncertainty that they do about other empirical components of interpretive 
choice”265. Thus, according to Vermeule, judges should focus “upon the variables they 
understand best, and should choose interpretive doctrines with a view of minimizing legal 
uncertainty, judicial vacillation and the costs of litigation and judicial decision-making”266. 
 
One of the dimensions of interpretive choice is also “the choice among a whole 
menagerie of forms (rules, standard, presumptions, rules with exceptions, etc)”267. According 
to Vermeule, “(r)ules economize on information and thus often reduce legal uncertainty and 
judicial decision costs, at least in the short term”268. Yet rules may prove over or under-
inclusive, and “may raise error costs relative to the performance of a fully informed and fully 
competent decision-maker using a standard”269. The choice of the specific legal form will 
require “empirical assessments of the competence of the judges or decision-makers who will 
apply the chosen legal doctrine, the relative decision costs of rules, standards, and their 
variants, and the effects of the choice of form on the legislative and administrative 
institutions who create law and on the private firms and individuals who live under it”270. The 
choice of legal form has thus an effect on the allocation of decision-making authority. 
Standards delegate authority to the decision-maker at the point of application. Rules “vest 
authority in the rule formulators rather than in those who apply the rule in particular cases at 
a later time”271. Hence, for Vermeule, rules “require more information and decisional 
competence ex ante, at the time the rule formulators decide what the content of the rule 
should be”, while “standards require more information and decisional competence ex post, at 
the time of application”. An important consideration in the choice between rules and 
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standards is thus “whether the rule creators, or instead the rule appliers have better 
information and superior competence to translate information into sound legal policy”272. 
 
If one follows this approach in conceptualizing interpretive choice, the prospects for a 
pluralist programme with regard to the goals of EU competition law may run to important 
institutional difficulties, if this is to be implemented by courts. Yet, the main actors of the 
adjudicative process in EU Competition law are competition authorities rather than courts, in 
view of the predominant role played by administrative enforcement in EU competition law 
and the limited role of courts with regard to the judicial review of competition authorities’ 
decisions. Competition authorities may take the form of independent administrative agencies, 
or the form of a ministerial department, as it is the case with the DG Competition at the 
European Commission. Their attractiveness in terms of institutional choice and the resulting 
interpretive choices they adhere to differs from those of courts and may even vary among 
them, depending on their mandate and institutional capacities. Competition law principles 
may also be applied by sector specific regulators in disputes rising in regulated sectors of the 
economy (e.g. telecoms, energy, more generally utilities); in some jurisdictions, regulators 
dispose of a concurrent authority to that of competition authorities to implement EU 
competition law.  
 
Modelled closely to the paradigm of court adjudication, the adjudicative process in 
regulatory agencies and competition authorities involves the participation of the affected 
parties in the decision-making process through the presentation of proofs and reasoned 
arguments. However, despite the effort recently made in EU Competition law to reinforce the 
judicial characteristics of the administrative enforcement process by protecting the rights of 
defence and introducing a limited adversarial dimension in the process (e.g. oral hearing, the 
reinforced role of the hearing officer)
273
, decision-making in the European Commission is 
markedly different from that followed in courts. This is not only function of the inquisitorial 
character of the procedure, but also of the “polycentric” nature of the disputes competition 
authorities are generally asked to address. By “polycentric”, it is not only meant a situation in 
which the decision may affect many actors, thus leading to a fluid state of affairs if all 
affected interests are taken into account, but also encloses situations when a decision over the 
position of one of the actors would have a different set of repercussions and might require in 
each instance a redefinition of the parties affected
274
. Concealed polycentric elements are 
present in all problems resolved by adjudication: the rule of precedent or stare decisis being 
an illustration. The more polycentric a dispute is, the more flexible the decision-maker should 
be and the more “liberally” judicial precedents would be interpreted and subject to 
reformulation, as problems not originally foreseen arise
275
.  
 
Competition law disputes have seen their polycentric dimension accentuated with the 
move towards a more economic approach. The original setting put in place by the constitutive 
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Treaties was the result of a compromise between the German ordo-liberal model of 
neoliberalism and the model of strong administrative or regulatory involvement in the 
economy that had emerged in liberal democracies of the West following the Great Depression 
in the 1930s and Keynesian economics. An important element of the German neo-liberal 
programme was that the “juridical”, the Rule of Law, should be implemented in the economic 
order: as Foucault has presciently explained in his lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics, 
applying the principle of the Rule of Law in the economic order “means that the state can 
make legal interventions in the economic order only if these legal interventions take the form 
solely of the introduction of formal principles”276. This is the complete opposite of a plan, 
that is, “the adoption of precise and definite economic ends”277. According to Foucault, 
 
“(t)he Rule of law will have the possibility of formulating certain measures of a general 
kind, but these must remain completely formal and must never pursue a particular end 
[…] [First,] (a) law in the economic order must remain strictly formal. It must tell people 
what they mist and must not do; it must not be inscribed within an overall economic 
choice. […] [Second,] it must be conceived a priori in the form of fixed rules and must 
never be rectifiable by reference to the effects produced. Third, it must define a 
framework within which economic agents can freely make their decisions, inasmuch as, 
precisely, every agent knows that the legal framework is fixed in its action and will not 
change […]”278. 
 
Ordoliberals emphasized the role of the judiciary or adjudication in general, as opposed to 
the model of managerial direction in central planned economies: “(i)t is now advisable, to 
make courts, more than in the past, organs of the economy and to entrust to their decision 
tasks that were previously entrusted to administrative authorities”279. The competition law 
provisions of the Treaty and their implementation by the European Courts and the European 
Commission, at least until the advent of the “more economic” “effects-based” approach in the 
1990s, exemplified these institutional and interpretive choices. Competition law rules were 
subject to adjudication by national courts as well as by the European Commission, which 
would not however act as a central planner or as a regulator in this context, but as an 
adjudicator, with streamlined rules of procedure, limited remedial tools and subject to judicial 
scrutiny by a generalist court. The predominant goal of EU competition law at the time, 
economic freedom or freedom to compete of economic actors (suppliers, distributors), was 
equally adjudication friendly, as it is the function of the courts to declare and adjudicate 
conflicting rights. The competition law provisions with the strongest polycentric dimension, 
such as Article 101(3), were of the exclusive competence of the European Commission, as a 
result of the legal authorisation system adopted by Regulation 17/62 and the obligation 
imposed to the parties to notify their agreements to the European Commission.  
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The move towards a more economic approach and a system of legal exception in the 
context of Article 101 TFEU has accentuated the polycentric dimension of competition law 
disputes. Consumers active in the specific relevant market were added to the list of the 
participants affected by the adjudicated transaction, their interest(s) being given the most 
important weight in the decision-making process (because of the emphasis on consumer 
harm). The polycentric character of competition law disputes will no doubt increase in 
intensity, should EU competition law move to a holistic approach and incorporate more 
systematically public policy concerns, thus multiplying the categories of affected participants 
and the conflicting interests to take into account. The number of affected participants and the 
complexity of repercussions, because of the variety of interests to take into account, might 
justify a shift in institutional and interpretive choice. 
 
What becomes important is thus the “question of knowing when the polycentric elements 
have become so significant and predominant that the proper limits of adjudication have been 
reached”280. Problems that are sufficiently polycentric may be unsuited for adjudication and 
may be resolved either through managerial direction, through negotiation and contract
281
, or 
left to the forces of the market. Some problems, such as the allocation of economic resources, 
may indeed “present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for adjudication”282. Fuller 
explains what happens when an attempt is made to deal by adjudicative forms with a problem 
that is essentially polycentric: 
 
“[…] three things can happen, sometimes all at once. First, the adjudicative solution may 
fail. Unexpected repercussions make the decision unworkable; it is ignored, withdrawn, 
or modified, sometimes repeatedly. Second, the purported arbiter ignores judicial 
proprieties - he "tries out" various solutions in post-hearing conferences, consults parties 
not represented at the hearings, guesses at facts not proved and not properly matters for 
anything like judicial notice. Third, instead of accommodating his procedures to the 
nature of the problem he confronts, he may reformulate the problem so as to make it 
amenable to solution through adjudicative procedures”283. 
 
 A holistic competition law might run to similar difficulties, although it may be 
normatively more appealing than the other options on offer. The experience on the 
implementation of Section 21 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (RTPA) of 1956 in the 
UK, a contemporary regime to the German Act Against Restraints of Competition of 1957 
and the Treaty of Rome, might provide some interesting historical insights to the difficulties 
of a holistic competition law regime. Section 21 of the RTPA provided that any restrictions of 
competition provided by the Act were prima facie contrary to the public interest unless the 
parties to the agreement brought evidence that the agreement satisfied the conditions of a 
number of gateways instituted by the RTPA, such as the protection of the public against 
injury in connection with the consumption, installation or use of the goods, the protection of 
the benefits that purchasers, consumers or users of the goods would get from the restriction to 
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competition, the possibility for the parties to deal with a preponderant customer or supplier, 
the prevention of serious unemployment, among others. These considerations were subject to 
a balancing test. The balancing was to be implemented by a specialised court, the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Court (RTPC), a mixed court of professional judges and laymen. Although 
the gateways were narrowly defined and did not include all public policy concerns, there was 
some discussion over their justiciability, in other words their amenity to adjudication, once 
the relevant facts have been ascertained
284. Justiciability also involves that the “answer which 
would be given by persons of common training and habits of thought would be 
predictable”285. One of the main difficulties was for the Court to form predictable and valid 
value judgments upon matters of economics, the different commentators questioning the 
ability of the judicial process based upon the adversary system to provide a suitable 
machinery for ascertaining the relevant facts and evaluating conflicting expert opinions on 
matters of economics. In particular, the difficulties of selecting the appropriate economic 
hypothesis or of predicting future business behaviour and economic conditions were dully 
noted. Yet, despite the inherent weakness of using the judicial process for making regulatory 
decisions, the operation of the RTPC exemplifies the strategy of adjusting the adjudicative 
process to polycentric questions. First, the Court discouraged any tendency to treat its 
decisions in particular cases as binding precedents
286
, thus offering an increased degree of 
flexibility in assessing new problems and factual issues. Second, the Court took care to 
reformulate the problems submitted to it in a way more amenable to adjudication, by 
emphasizing the primordial role of the promotion of competition as the basic policy of the 
Act and by refusing to take into account the implications or effects of its decisions, for 
example on unemployment, as this would be an important departure from the legalistic 
reasoning required by the judicial function. The Court also adopted a more flexible approach 
to balancing while realigning the burden of proof in order to reduce the cost of collecting and 
assessing information on the different gateways
287
. 
 
  The evolution of EU Competition law towards the adoption of a more narrowly 
defined standard of consumer harm
288
, the elaboration of new legal categories, such as price 
and non-price restraints
289
, and presumptions with regard to anticompetitive effects, such as 
prices below average variable costs for predatory pricing
290
 or the exclusion of an as efficient 
as competitor in margin squeeze cases
291
 may be considered as a necessary adjustment for 
accommodating the adjudicative process to the polycentric dimension of the more economic 
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effects-based approach. At the same time, we have witnessed the propensity of competition 
authorities, the specialised adjudicators which, one would have expected, would embrace the 
effects-based approach, to bring largely anticompetitive object cases (rather than 
anticompetitive effects), thus relying on presumptions and analytical shortcuts rather than 
sophisticated economic analysis, and to have increasingly recourse to commitment decisions 
rather than infringement decisions, thus introducing some degree of negotiation with the 
parties to the dispute and consultation with affected parties in the context of the adjudicative 
process. The criticisms against the implementation of excessive pricing provisions and the 
pursuance of fairness objectives in EU competition law have also relied on the difficulties of 
the adjudicative process to handle what is quintessentially a polycentric issue, the level of 
pricing, which produces effects on the relevant market and beyond. It is this polycentric 
dimension, rather than the difficulty of the courts to deal with price setting in general
292
, 
which explains the relatively cautious approach of EU competition law in these areas and the 
opposition expressed by some Advocates General of the CJEU to any attempt of transforming 
the Court to some form of price regulator
293
. 
 
 Facing the prospect of increasingly polycentric disputes post Lisbon Treaty, 
competition authorities in Europe, and in particular the European Commission, may be 
tempted to reformulate the “consumer harm” standard in a way that would encompass the 
various facets of the “well-being of the Union”, including a high degree of environmental and 
social protection or privacy concerns. The highly ambiguous and vague jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice with regard to the objectives of EU competition law may be explained by an 
informed choice to defer to the Commission’s judgment and priorities on the objectives of its 
enforcement action. Probably, the Court’s abstention in defining an objective or a hierarchy 
of goals in EU competition law may be the result of an implicit comparative institutional 
analysis, the Court acknowledging that in a multi-level polity, such as the EU, with various 
interlocking areas of competence, a hybrid political/adjudicative body, such as the European 
Commission, might be better placed to increase participation in decision-making, while 
avoiding minority and majoritarian biases. After all, as the Court recognized in Masterfoods, 
“(t)he Commission, entrusted by Article [105(1) TFEU] with the task of ensuring application 
of the principles laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU], is responsible for defining and 
implementing the orientation of Community competition policy”294. It follows that, because 
of its peculiar institutional setting, in particular its hybrid nature, a competition law 
adjudicator with increased competences in other areas of public policy, EU competition law 
might be able to follow a more pluralistic agenda, with regard to the values and goals 
inspiring its action, than US antitrust law, which merely relies on the institutional mechanism 
of the court system and remains constrained by it. This may have justified the recent 
expansion by the Supreme Court of the realm of the rule of reason standard, instead of that of 
per se illegality. It is well known that the rule of reason standard operates in practice as a 
form of presumptive legality rule, which hints to the implicit Supreme Court’s comparative 
institutional analysis that certain commercial practices should not be assessed within the 
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adjudicative process, but be left to the market process. From this perspective, the expansion 
of the rule of reason standard signals the institutional choice of the market process as opposed 
to that of the adjudicative process. 
 
 It is also important to adopt a more cautious approach on the alleged weaknesses of 
the adjudicative process to handle polycentric questions. As we have previously explained, 
institutional choice involves a selection among imperfect institutional alternatives. Certainly, 
the adjudicative process might present a number of flaws, but other institutional alternatives, 
such as negotiating transactions in a market or managerial direction in a regulatory context 
might still offer less satisfactory solutions with regard to the aim of enhancing total 
participation
295
. The market might be concentrated and controlled by powerful economic 
interests or consumers might be unable to exercise choice freely because of behavioral biases 
and economic coercion; regulators might also be captured by vested interests. In contrast to 
single institutional analysis, comparative institutional analysis implies that the choice of the 
societal objectives to be achieved through the implementation of competition law should be a 
matter of circumstances and dependent on the wider institutional context. The literature on 
the goals of EU Competition law has so far focused on a sterile debate over programmatic 
objectives and an acute institutional pessimism for what can be achieved within the existing 
institutional setting, committing the fallacy of single institutional analysis. It is now time to 
move away from the issue of goals and focus on the question of institutions and comparative 
institutional choice. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The study first took a normative perspective and examined the various goals that have 
been advanced by competition law literature on the objectives of EU competition law. A 
critical analysis of this literature has shown the weaknesses of an economic welfare approach 
and the difficulties, as well as the normative objections, to incorporating non-welfare goals in 
the implementation of EU competition law. The normative perspective was then followed by 
an analysis of positive EU competition law arriving to the conclusion that the case law of the 
EU Courts is ambiguous as to the existence of a hierarchy of objectives in EU competition 
law and that the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty opens the door to a more holistic competition 
law, in congruent co-existence with the other Treaty provisions and policies instituted by the 
EU Treaties. The final part criticizes the literature on the goals of EU competition law for its 
emphasis on goals. I argue that the choice of a general objective as an enforcement criterion 
tells us little about whether any particular institution, for example the adjudicative process, 
should be charged with implementing that criterion. Comparative institutional analysis 
emphasizes the connections between issues of institutional choice and goals. The question of 
goals should follow and not precede that of institutional choice. Institutional choice should be 
comparative and not proceed to choosing an institution without a proper analysis of the 
alternative institutions on offer. The conceptualization of the role of courts, and other 
institutions in a holistic competition law, using comparative institutional analysis, is one of 
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the major challenges faced by EU competition law, and new competition law regimes, in the 
future. 
 
 
 
